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Preface to the Special Edition
The analytical process known as counterterrorism (CT) net 
assessment anticipates our ability to counter threats and thus provides a perspec-
tive on the factors that could define success or failure for US CT policy that is 
fundamentally different from other methods. CT net assessments help decision 
makers understand what is truly important about an issue by balancing desired 
outcomes and anticipated policy effects in the face of struggle. It is called a “net” 
assessment because it considers how we fare in removing obstacles, overcoming 
resistance, and exploiting opportunities to achieve our desired outcomes. Some 
threats might appear great but can largely be mitigated with current policies and 
capabilities, while others that seem more minor might turn out to be inexorable 
and actually pose a greater net concern. 
Anticipating what is coming over the next ridgeline—be it cyber attacks, ter-
rorism, weapons of mass destruction, or something not yet considered—is 
not a trivial endeavor. The simultaneous interactions of networks, technology, 
information, and politics combine to produce a potentially sinister, dauntingly 
complex strategic brew. Getting a handle on this strategic complexity requires a 
broader knowledge base than ever before to understand how varied and seem-
ingly unrelated parts interact with one another—at dizzying speeds—to create 
new possibilities. 
CT net assessment offers unique information that helps its users to achieve and 
sustain a competitive advantage. Such assessments require a strong and accurate 
diagnosis of the causes that underlie strengths as well as weaknesses, and how 
these causal factors interact and coevolve. A good diagnosis will provide the 
necessary “sense-making” to guide appropriate action in full cognizance of 
the long-term consequences of both action and inaction, in terms of potential 
threats and opportunities across a range of policy choices. A bad diagnosis can 
lead to policy choices that are inefficient, ineffective, and potentially tragic.
A CT net assessment process that considers and anticipates the emergence of 
new threats and the transformation of current ones challenges the traditional, 
static “war on terror” paradigm. Because new threats arise and old ones mutate, 
a theory of victory needs to focus on managing threats, similar to the strategic 
model used by police agencies as opposed to a World War II–style model of 
submission and defeat. The need for new thinking about the contours of success 
is especially obvious when one considers that CT activities in themselves greatly 
influence the emergence and evolution of violent non-state actors.
Rather than examining our own capabilities and limitations, or assessing the 
implications of the multifaceted strategic environment, most intelligence focuses 
on evaluating the capabilities of our adversaries. We need to expand beyond that 
approach and consider the net effect of the coevolutionary interaction of three 
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complex dynamics: ourselves, the environment, and the adversary. The information produced through CT net assessment 
can help decision makers to focus and prioritize policies and resources to achieve advantage and hedge against uncertain fu-
ture developments. Understanding our sources of advantage and those of our adversaries helps us to determine our leverage 
in a given situation and the conditions in the strategic environment that favor loss and opportunity. 
We anticipate that this special issue of the Combating Terrorism Exchange will help the National Counterterrorism Cen-
ter’s net assessment practitioners and our colleagues in other agencies and other countries refine our craft as we continue to 
evolve in our thinking about and approach to net assessment. v
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Foreword Dr. John Arquilla,  US Naval Postgraduate School
In 1942, not long after the United States entered World War II, 
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox gave a speech in which he said, “Modern 
warfare is an intricate business about which no one knows everything and few 
know very much.” He spoke at a time of great adversity, when the German 
Army’s blitzkrieg on land and the Imperial Japanese Navy’s aircraft carriers at sea 
had transformed the face of battle. U-boats were decimating shipping along the 
East Coast of the United States, and Stuka dive-bombers had already turned 
many European cities into rubble. To Knox, whose battle experience was as a 
member of Teddy Roosevelt’s Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War back 
in 1898,1 the technology of war had made quite startling advances and brought 
to life remarkable, if vexing, new military doctrines.  
But one thing had not really changed: the nature of the adversaries. The Axis 
powers were still recognizable nation-states, with finite production possibilities 
and manpower. This made strategic assessment relatively easy, because it was 
possible to reckon the potential of the threats clearly and to map out a design 
for victory along the well-known, well-worn paths of previous wars. Thus, if 
the Germans were able to win the Battle of France in 1940 with no more than 
10 panzer divisions in the field, then the United States would deploy more than 
double that number of its own armored divisions—which it did. If the Luftwaffe 
could keep just a few thousand fighters and bombers in the air, then American 
aircraft production would rise to tens of thousands annually. In December 1941, 
the US Navy had just seven aircraft carriers, but by the summer of 1945 it had 
built a hundred carriers—many times more than Japan could produce.2 And this 
was just the American contribution; the other Allies were producing mightily 
as well. Thus it became clear that, no matter the skill of German panzer generals 
and Japanese carrier admirals, they were going down in utter defeat. As historian 
John Ellis so succinctly described the German dilemma, “Once Hitler arrayed 
himself against the material might of both Russia and the USA, his battle, even 
for mere survival, was hopeless.” 3
This simple, reassuring straightforwardness about strategic affairs was bound not 
to last. 
In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the process of assessment has 
become much more difficult. This may be less true for nation-vs.-nation calcula-
tions, in which numbers of tanks, planes, ships, and missiles are still thought 
to matter to some degree, but it has been the reality in the area of “peoples’ 
wars,” in which irregular concepts of operations and the sheer grit of committed 
insurgents swept the world clean of colonial rule during the postwar decades. 
This first wave of anticolonial nonstate actors proved able to fight on—and 
more often than not, to win—despite deep material deficiencies. Today, they 
are being followed by a second wave of guerrilla and terrorist movements that is 
particularly distinguished by its networked organizational forms. These violent 
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loosely joined.” 4 They pursue common goals with little central control or even 
coordination. They are hard to detect and track, much less to disrupt or destroy. 
They include al Qaeda and ISIS, Hezbollah and Hamas, Boko Haram and the 
Houthis, Jemaah Islamiyah and the Moros. The Taliban, too. If the Muslim 
thread that runs through these groups suggests that religious zeal is a source of 
strength, then one might ponder why the vast numbers of the world’s devout 
Muslims, who actively oppose and vastly outnumber the jihadis, have had so 
little effect to date in quelling them.  
But religion is simply one aspect of culture. Given that, from the seventh to the 
seventeenth centuries, successive Muslim powers were both aggressive and highly 
innovative, there may be some value in assessing insurgent and terrorist jihadi 
networks today in light of the amazing achievements of their forebears. For 
example—and this is perhaps the single best example—consider the half century 
of Islamic expansion after the Prophet’s death (in 632 CE), which featured loose-
jointed, highly flexible military formations that won an empire stretching from 
the Strait of Gibraltar in the west to Samarkand, more than 6,000 km to the east 
in Central Asia. Field Marshal Viscount Bernard Montgomery, in his sweeping 
History of Warfare, ascribed this stunning success less to force majeure than to 
“morale, mobility, and endurance.” 5
These same qualities have been very much on display across the violent jihadi 
networks that have bedeviled allied armies in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past 
decade, against which technological and material advantages have proved of 
little value. Indeed, the fact that current-era networks of jihadis have sustained 
protracted campaigns from West Africa to Southeast Asia—and have been able 
on occasion to mount strikes much farther afield—is prima facie evidence that 
these groups’ opponents must develop newer, fresher approaches to strategic 
assessment in order to fully understand and ultimately counter them. Here, too, 
there are lessons to be drawn from seventh-century events, when the two most 
advanced militaries of the time, those of the Persian and the Byzantine empires, 
were bowled over by the armies of Islam—the former being conquered outright 
and the latter rocked to its roots. In the words of Sir John Bagot Glubb, who did 
some soldiering with Arab armies in his time, the first Muslims “swept irresistibly 
forward without organization, without pay, without plans, and without orders. 
They constitute a perpetual warning to technically advanced nations who rely for 
their defence on scientific progress rather than the human spirit.” 6
Glubb thus prefigured Montgomery’s first factor for success: morale, an element 
which itself goes far toward explaining his third factor, the sheer persistence of 
these fighters. The implication is that strategic assessment processes today must 
focus on the psychological dimension of irregular warfare with both energy and 
insight. Although the fighting spirit of German and Japanese soldiers late in 
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World War II remained high even when defeat was inevitable, this factor was less 
important to the outcome of that material-driven conflict. Today, by contrast, 
the resilient morale of insurgents and terrorists is undoubtedly crucial to their 
successes in the field, and understanding the foundation of this tenacity—which 
is likely to be more than just blind religious zeal—may prove to be the single 
most important task of strategic assessment.  
Present-day jihadis seem to be as much motivated by the real power of a com-
pelling narrative about reducing the shadow cast by infidel influence over the 
Muslim world as by the promise of Paradise. When this narrative makes explicit 
links to the great victories of the early caliphs, the later Muslim triumphs over 
Crusaders and Mongols, and more recent successes against the Russians in 
Afghanistan, the Israelis in Lebanon, and so on, including the fights that are 
ongoing, the strength of the story grows exponentially.   
As to the remaining key factor mentioned by Montgomery, the sheer capacity 
to get around, insurgent mobility today is more a product of stealth than of 
the swift horses and durable camels that took the soldiers of the early caliph-
ates across such a wide swath of the world in such a short time. If the jihadi 
today cannot be detected and tracked early on, then he can “ride the rails” of 
globalization to get wherever he wishes to go, whether by turning a commercial 
airliner into a long-range cruise missile, or traveling by whatever varied means to 
reach the fight in some far-off land. Stealthiness destroys distance—yet another 
factor that turns classic strategic assessment on its head. Again, think back to 
the Second World War. Both the Germans and the Japanese conquered vast ter-
ritories, but the farther they went, the harder their efforts were to sustain, and 
the more utterly vulnerable they became to counterattacks. The Axis reverses at 
Stalingrad and Guadalcanal were no mysteries; they were the consequences of 
overextension. Not so today. The greater the geographic spread of contemporary 
jihadis, the greater the problems they pose for counterterrorist forces. This, too, 
is an area in which concepts of assessment must evolve. 
Clearly, traditional modes of strategic assessment do not work well when it 
comes to understanding the capabilities of non-state networks of insurgents 
and terrorists. The further possibility that nation-states may enter into dark 
alliances with such networks—including ones that prey upon the world in and 
from cyberspace—complicates the assessment of more traditional adversaries. 
One cannot view pro-Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine without 
great concern for the possibility that nations are opening up a whole new form 
of covert aggression by linking up with and motivating networks of non-state ac-
tors. What is more, both Russia and China have shown remarkable perspicacity 
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War II, vol. 15, Supplemental and General Index (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1962), 29–35.
3  John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second 
World War (New York: Viking Press, 1990), 30.
4 David Weinberger, Small Pieces Loosely Joined: A Unified Theory of 
the Web (New York: Perseus Books, 2002).  
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Hodder and Stoughton, 1963), 359.
7  John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar, MR-
789-OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1996), 43.
Thus, in addition to the eruption of the world’s first great war between nations 
and jihadi networks, ongoing since 9/11, there is yet another conflict emerging, 
one in which coalitions of nations and networks will increasingly face off against 
each other. Not a cold war, but a “cool war.” Unlike the Cold War arms race to 
build nuclear weapons, however, the principal dynamic is now an “organizational 
race” to build networks. Hoping to understand and master this new dynamic, 
many researchers in our Defense Analysis program at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, along with colleagues at Pennsylvania State University and at the National 
Counterterrorism Center, are looking at new ways to assess non-state actors.
This special issue of CTX is a major step that may help to guide the process of 
developing an innovative, much-needed new approach to the whole process of 
strategic assessment of non-state actors. Both the potential of and the challenges 
to this undertaking are well exposited by the authors herein. At this point, I 
can only add that, in addition to the value of the many substantive insights to 
be found in this issue, our hope is that a real sense of urgency will arise about 
the need to develop more network-oriented modes of assessment. It has been 
almost 20 years since David Ronfeldt and I first pointed to the rise of this threat 
from networks, and to the odd new mode of conflict that would come along 
with them. As we put the matter then,
Power is migrating to actors who are skilled at developing networks, 
and at operating in a world of networks. Actors positioned to take 
advantage of networking are being strengthened faster than actors 
embedded in old hierarchical structures that constrain networking. 
… Non-state adversaries—from warriors to criminals, especially 
those that are transnational—are currently ahead of government 
actors at using, and at being able to use, this mode of organization 
and related doctrines and strategies.7    
We lag far behind in an “organizational race” in which non-state actors have 
been given quite a head start. Now it is time to start catching up. v
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Introduction to the Special Issue Dr. Scott Sigmund Gartner Pennsylvania State University
The rapid rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) seemed to stun Ameri-
can leaders. US President Barack Obama stated, “There is no doubt that their 
advance, their movement over the last several months has been more rapid than 
the intelligence estimates and, I think, the expectations of policymakers both in 
and outside of Iraq,” 1 an observation echoed by Director of National Intelligence 
James Clapper.2 There is a widespread view that US intelligence agencies were 
surprised by the meteoric rise of ISIS and its effectiveness at acquiring territory: 
“Intelligence agencies were caught off guard by the speed of the extremists’ 
subsequent advance across northern Iraq.” 3 Many see this as an intelligence 
failure: “We got caught flat-footed. Period.”4 These views raise fundamental 
concerns about US intelligence agencies’ ability to accurately assess the capabili-
ties, interests, and actions of violent non-state actors (VNSAs).
Net assessment “looks at the strategic match between the two sides’ strengths 
and weakness.”5 Integrating highly disparate factors into a single calculation 
represents a considerable challenge.6 But without assessments, it is impossible to 
adopt and adapt effective security policy.7 The question then is, How should we 
conduct net assessments of violent non-state actors in a way that addresses these 
inherent challenges? As we see with ISIS, a comparatively distant, nonexistential 
threat can monopolize the focus of a government’s security, intelligence, and 
political apparatuses. It has never been more vital to be able to anticipate the rise 
and decline of these violent groups.
Having the ability to develop a complete and accurate picture of violent non-
state actors is not just a US concern, but represents a critical capability for all 
nations. The current era, characterized by asymmetric warfare and the scourge 
of transnational terrorism, has seen a rise in intrastate conflict coincident with 
a dramatic decline in the occurrence of interstate wars. In each case, groups, not 
nations, represent the threat. Or, as John Arquilla warns in the foreword to this 
special issue, “There is yet another conflict emerging, one in which coalitions of 
nations and networks will increasingly face off against each other.” It is vital for 
the security of the world’s nations to be able to determine which of those groups 
are more capable and threatening, which areas are likely to see the greatest 
emergence of violent non-state actors, and how environmental factors influence 
the insurgent-counterinsurgent dynamic. Net Assessment 2.0 thus represents an 
essential global concern.
Net assessments by the US government have traditionally focused on state-vs.-
state competitions, such as a long-term focus on the Cold War rivalry between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.8 The most important of these net 
assessments was conducted by the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA), 
led by Andrew Marshall.9 The job of the ONA was to “analyze the relative power 
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of the United States and the Soviet Union—that is, to 
assess how the two nations’ strengths and weaknesses 
netted out.” 10 Marshall developed a complex and 
comprehensive methodology for acquiring information 
and transforming divergent factors into comparable 
metrics.11
The ONA’s challenge, however, pales in comparison to 
that which analysts face when assessing VNSAs. States 
have comparatively static boundaries, slowly changing 
populations, fixed resource endowments, predictable in-
terests, and sluggishly adaptive institutions. By contrast, 
non-state actors such as terrorist and insurgent groups 
rapidly emerge, change, and die, and have widely varying 
capabilities, interests, and behaviors.12 These groups even 
“change their policies and shift back and forth between 
violent and nonviolent strategies, occasionally adopting 
both at the same time.” 13 The physical resources of a 
transnational terror group like Boko Haram are min-
iscule compared to those of even a small state.14 VNSAs 
lack clearly observable features like roads, mines, missile 
silos, factories, and ports that can be counted, weighed, 
and assessed. These factors make comprehensive net as-
sessments of VNSAs extremely challenging and possibly 
even unachievable.15
Producing net assessments of VNSAs requires that we both borrow from and 
expand beyond the traditional approach to threat analysis. “By definition, a 
comprehensive terrorism assessment must include more than just a threat evalu-
ation.” 16 Given the relative lack of physical resources commanded by VNSAs, 
the key to countering them is to understand how these groups manipulate 
information and perceptions across networks to gain recruits, manipulate policy, 
and instill fear.17 This new method must not only range beyond the traditional 
parameters of the ONA protocol,18 but must also include fresh and innovative 
approaches. 
In 2013, a small cadre from the National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate 
for Strategic Operational Planning created a Net Assessment Branch. This new 
team began a multiyear project to produce a new way to conduct net assessments 
that could apply to non-state actors. The goal of this special issue of the Com-
bating Terrorism Exchange is to introduce new ways of thinking that challenge 
the epistemology of how net assessments have been conducted for the past 50 
years. These articles make a strong case against “business as usual” when it comes 
to producing net assessments of non-state actors. The essays reveal innovative 
concepts and insights, some of which clearly must be incorporated into how the 
United States and its allies assess new threats, and all of which demonstrate the 
value of thinking creatively about security in the twenty-first century.












The seven essays begin with “Characteristics of Terrorism Hotspots” by James 
A. Piazza, which shows that places with high levels of human rights abuse are 
especially likely to see the emergence of terrorism. In their essay “The Blue-
Green-Red Metaphor in the Context of Counterterrorism: Clarifications and 
Anthropological Emendations,” Lawrence A. Kuznar and Carl W. Hunt take on 
traditional “blue–red–green” approaches to net assessment and suggest instead 
a new interdisciplinary perspective that examines disruptive and constructive 
functional capabilities. In a collaboration formed expressly for this issue, Mat-
thew M. Mars, Judith L. Bronstein, and Patricia L. Sullivan—experts on ecosys-
tems, biology, and political violence, respectively—use their article, “Disrupt, 
Dismantle, and Defeat: A Biological Ecosystem Perspective,” to describe an 
ecological approach to militant violence that highlights the critical role of 
“keystone” actors within an ecosystem. Many researchers view identity forma-
tion as one of the most critical factors driving VNSA emergence. Michael Vlahos 
explores how national and group identities are constructed, and the particular 
circumstances of the American identity, in the article “A Kinship Perspective 
on International Relations.” In “A New Lens for Assessing Our Power to Fight,” 
Leo Blanken and Jason Lepore look at the constraining role that politics and 
norms play in national security and make a strong case for including these 
political norms in net assessments. Melvin J. Konner explores the powerful role 
that metaphors and conceptual models play in influencing the way we conduct 
net assessments and cautions about an overreliance on predictive modeling in 
his essay, “The Weather of Violence: Metaphors and Models, Predictions and 
Surprises.” Finally, in “When Net Assessment Leads down the Wrong Counter-
terrorism Path,” two-time US ambassador Dennis Jett questions the value of the 
entire net assessment enterprise, suggesting we look instead at how to encourage 
the development of democratic institutions and norms in unstable countries.
Terrorism generates both fear and confusion, which can easily lead to overreac-
tion by its targets, and in the end, this overreaction represents the true existen-
tial threat. During his US Civil War campaigns, Confederate General Stonewall 
Jackson drove to “always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy if possible.” 
Developing improved ways to conduct net assessments of violent non-state ac-
tors represents a major step in demystifying this type of threat and taking greater 
control of our global security. As CAPT Todd G. Veazie notes in the preface 
to this issue, the stakes are high. “A good diagnosis will provide the necessary 
‘sense-making’ to guide appropriate action in full cognizance of the long-term 
consequences of both action and inaction, in terms of potential threats and 
opportunities across a range of policy choices. A bad diagnosis can lead to policy 
choices that are inefficient, ineffective, and potentially tragic.” v
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Characteristics of Terrorism Hotspots Dr. James A. Piazza,  Pennsylvania State University
What types of countries are more likely to experience ter-
rorism? This seemingly simple question is crucial when conducting a net 
assessment of the environment in which terrorist activity occurs. Understand-
ing which countries are terrorism-prone—what might be called “terrorism 
hotspots”—helps experts understand the conditions that are conducive to terror-
ist activity.1 In this article, I discuss five factors that appear frequently in empiri-
cal research as contributors to terrorist activity both within countries and across 
borders. These include the socioeconomic status of the country, such as its level 
of poverty; political qualities such as whether the country’s governing regime is a 
democracy or a dictatorship; the government’s respect for human rights and the 
degree to which it uses repression in response to dissent; the treatment of ethnic 
and religious minorities; and whether the country has experienced a foreign 
military intervention. Each of these five factors has figured prominently in the 
national discussion about terrorism and counterterrorism among US policymak-
ers and scholars since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Empirical research on them 
reveals patterns that can inform the net assessment of violent non-state actors.  
In this article, I discuss each of these five factors in turn by examining the evi-
dence from the available empirical research. I then use some descriptive statistics 
to examine the factors’ influence on terrorist attacks in countries in the post–9/11 
era, and conclude by producing a composite profile of a terrorism hotspot. But 
first it is necessary to define some terms.
What Is Terrorism?
Terrorism is a politically freighted, emotionally provocative, and highly con-
tested term that has eluded attempts by policymakers and scholars to develop a 
universally accepted definition for it.2 I prefer the operational definition used by 
the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
at the University of Maryland: terrorism is “the threatened or actual use of 
illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, reli-
gious or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” 3 In this article I con-
sider two categories of terrorism: domestic terrorist attacks that occur within a 
single country, and transnational terrorist attacks perpetrated by the citizens of 
one country against another country. These categories allow me to compare the 
factors of the country in which an attack occurs with the factors of the country 
or countries the terrorists hail from. For example, if I were to evaluate the factors 
within the United States on 11 September 2001 that facilitated the attacks, such 
as intelligence or policing failures, I would also examine the political, social, and 
economic features of the countries that the 9/11 hijackers came from to better 
understand their motivations. 
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What Causes Terrorism? The Five Factors
What specific internal conditions might make a country more likely to experience 
terrorism on its soil? What domestic conditions might cause the citizens of a 
country to be more likely to commit terrorist attacks against another country? 
Empirical research on the causes of terrorism have burgeoned since the 9/11 
attacks, and some tentative patterns have emerged. 
Poverty
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, US President George W. Bush famously 
linked poverty with terrorism, remarking, “We fight against poverty, because 
hope is an answer to terror.” 4 Bush was joined in this assessment by a wide as-
sortment of politicians and public figures. The relationship between poverty and 
terrorism makes some intuitive sense. People living in conditions of economic 
deprivation can develop strong grievances that they have no hope of resolving 
and might resort to political violence as a way of calling attention to their 
situation. The immiseration accompanying poverty may attune people to radical 
beliefs and extremist movements that seem to offer change.  
Furthermore, poverty, unemployment, and lack of access to education could 
reduce the opportunity costs associated with engaging in terrorism. People 
suffering from economic deprivation would seem to have less to lose by joining 
or supporting terrorist movements than those with a greater stake in their society 
and its economic opportunities. Researchers, however, have not generally found 
poor people to be more likely to engage in terrorism, or terrorism to occur in 
poor countries or terrorist acts to become more frequent during economic 
downturns or crises.5 Most indicators of economic development, such as gross 
domestic product per capita, are unreliable predictors of terrorist activity. Some 
studies even suggest that, although there is not strong evidence showing that 
poor countries incubate terrorism, wealthier countries are more likely to be 
targeted by terrorists.6 There is a logic to this proposition. In addition to being a 
tactic used to garner attention and to communicate to a larger audience, ter-
rorism is a tool of weak actors that face strong adversaries. Thus, weak domestic 
or transnational non-state opponents of a wealthy country may opt to engage 
in terrorism rather than use conventional force. Wealthy countries contain 
more and better targets for terrorists, are more likely to have well-developed 
media, and are militarily stronger than poor countries. Finally, rich countries are 
symbols of the global status quo, which increases their desirability as targets to 
antisystem actors like terrorists. Therefore, poor and underdeveloped countries 
are not necessarily terrorism hotspots.
Lack of Democratic Rule 
As the justification for the 2003 US invasion of Iraq transformed from a policy 
intended to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring and deploying weapons of 
mass destruction to democracy promotion, terrorism researchers turned their 
attention to the relationship between authoritarian rule and terrorism. Conven-
tional wisdom suggested that the absence of democratic rights and freedoms, 
particularly in regions like the Middle East, promoted terrorism because in such 
polities citizens are denied nonviolent legal routes to redress their grievances. 










the first place, to be more politically stable, and to produce nonviolent norms of 
political behavior, all of which dampen terrorist activity.7 Democracies, however, 
also have many features that aid terrorist movements. In addition to fostering 
free media that can be used to amplify the propaganda value of terrorist attacks, 
many democracies afford their citizens freedoms of assembly, association, and 
movement; guarantee the legal rights of the accused; and put limits on police 
power. This produces real vulnerabilities for democracies and constrains their 
counterterrorism policies.8   
The empirical evidence on democracy and terrorism has generally failed to vin-
dicate the “democracy promotion as counterterrorism” hypothesis. Many studies 
have found that democracies do not experience fewer terrorist attacks or produce 
fewer terrorists.9 Nevertheless, there are some nuances in the literature. For 
example, some research indicates that specific features of democratic rule, such 
as broad political participation, reduce terrorism while others, such as restraints 
on executive action and limitations on policing and surveillance, increase its 
likelihood.10 Still other research finds that recently democratized regimes are at 
a higher risk for terrorist activity than more mature, established democracies.11 
This latter finding has clear implications for US efforts to democratize countries 
like Iraq and Afghanistan, which I discuss in more detail in the conclusion to 
this article.
Human Rights
Though democracy is not a simple antidote for terrorism, a feature associated 
with liberal political rule—the preservation of human rights—seems to be 
closely associated with reduced levels of terrorist activity. Countries whose gov-
ernments abuse the human rights of their citizens tend to experience significantly 
more terrorism in the years subsequent to a crackdown, and this is found to be 
particularly true when abuses are widespread.12 This is a cross-national empirical 
finding that conforms to much of the case literature on the subject. During 
crackdowns against dissent, protest, and political violence, official tolerance 
of the human rights abuses committed by security forces—including torture 
of suspected terrorists and their supporters and arrest and detention without 
trial—frequently produced terrorism backlashes. In countries like France during 
the Algerian War (1954–1962), Britain during the early years of the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland (1968 through the 1980s), Egypt in the early 1980s after the as-
sassination of President Anwar Sadat, and Turkey during the Kurdish conflict in 
the 1990s, such abuses substantially worsened domestic terrorist activity. In each 
of these cases, human rights violations by governments radicalized detainees; 
alienated critical civilian populations; fueled the propaganda, fundraising, and 
recruitment efforts of terrorist movements; and weakened international counter-
terrorism cooperation.  
Minority Status
Another persistent finding in the empirical literature is that countries where 
ethnic or religious minority groups occupy a lower status in society compared to 
other groups are more likely to both experience and produce terrorism. This is 
particularly the case when those disadvantaged groups experience economic dis-
crimination or are excluded from political power.13 Exclusion and/or discrimina-
tion help to create and deepen ethnic or religious groups’ grievances against the 
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state, the majority population, and the status quo, while also fostering a sense of 
“otherness” within the minority community. At best, this weak social integration 
hinders government attempts to elicit the cooperation of civilian members of the 
minority group. Successful counterterrorism policy relies heavily on intelligence 
from members of the community within which terrorist groups operate. At 
worst, such alienation can solidify loyalty within the minority community to the 
terrorists themselves. 
It is critical to note that mere ethnic or religious diversity within countries has 
not been found to be a contributing factor to an increased risk of terrorism or 
political violence. The necessary ingredients are exclusion and discrimination. 
Moreover, empirical studies of large numbers of countries over time show that 
a low political or economic status for minorities is particularly likely to lead to 
terrorism and insurgency when oil wealth is present in the region in which they 
dwell and when the minority group is either geographically concentrated or has 
kin in other countries.14 
Foreign Military Interventions
Since 9/11, the United States, along with other countries, has launched several 
military interventions abroad to disrupt terror networks or to topple regimes ac-
cused of supporting terrorism.15 These include large-scale military incursions, with 
subsequent long occupations, in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as less-intrusive 
aerial and drone attacks against al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Pakistan and 
the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.16 The result of such interventions, according 
to some empirical studies, has been to incite more terrorism and to worsen the 
tactics terrorist groups use.17 Specifically, foreign intervention typically produces 
a nationalist backlash within the country that experiences the intervention, a 
reaction that is easily exploited by terrorist movements and extremists to garner 
support and to operate with greater impunity. Moreover, because they tend to 
further tip the balance of conventional power away from domestic insurgents, 
foreign military interventions and occupations incentivize the adoption of 
suicide bombings and other forms of extreme violence, particularly when such 
attacks are being directed against the occupying forces and their allies in the 
local government. 
The research on the use of drone attacks to fight terrorism, a tactic that has become 
more popular in the wake of costly direct post-9/11 military interventions, has 
had mixed findings. Some research suggests that, in general, the use of drone 
attacks has failed to degrade al Qaeda and other militant groups active in Paki-
stan, and has served to weaken the legitimacy of the US-backed government in 
Pakistan, as well as in Somalia and Yemen.18 Other preliminary work found some 
short-term benefits from drone attacks in Pakistan, at least in terms of reducing 
the severity of subsequent terrorist activity.19
Characteristics of Terrorism Hotspots
Given the body of empirical research on terrorism since 9/11, and what scholars 
have learned about the causes and patterns of terrorism, what does the composite 
picture of a terrorism hotspot look like? Does the presence of a high level or 
an increase in the level of these factors exacerbate a country’s likelihood of 










sense of these questions, I present some simple statistical information about the 
individual influence of the five factors discussed in this article.  
To accomplish this, I compiled a database of measures (post-9/11, from late 
2001 through 2012) for the five factors in 173 countries and observed the 
impact on both domestic and transnational terrorism produced by com-
paring their “low” (below median) to their “high” (above median) values.20 
To measure poverty and economic development, I used the United Nations 
Human Development Index.21 For democratic rule, I used an indicator of the 
political participation rate in elections in countries, produced by the Finnish 
Social Science Data Archive.22 To assess the human rights picture, I drew on 
data from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project on the occurrence of human 
rights abuses, specifically killings and physical abuse, within each country in 
my dataset.23 The numbers on minority discrimination, which measures the 
exclusion of minority community members from executive branch political 
power, come from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset.24 Finally, I drew data 
for the fifth factor—the impact of a foreign military intervention on levels of 
terrorism—from the International Military Intervention data project, which 
tracks interventions between the years 1946 and 2005. I used two different 
sources of data to compile the numbers on terrorist attacks: a count of all 
attacks occurring within a country25 and a count of attacks attributed to the 
perpetrators’ country or countries of national origin.26 The results of this process 



















Human Rights Abusesc + 412.8% +366.4%
Political Exclusion of Minoritiesc +233.6% +170.3%
Foreign Military Interventionc +227.3% +160.5%
Economic Development +187.2% -12.4%
Democratic Participation +215.1% -.9%
Notes: 
Percentage impact on counts of terrorist attacks in sample of 173 countries from 2001–2012 
obtained by comparing below median for sample (“low”) to above median for sample (“high”)
a Source: GTD  
b Source: ITERATE 
c Indicates that the factor is a statistically significant predictor of terrorist attacks in the full 
model.
Table 1.  How the Five Factors Affect Terrorist Attacks
What does a terrorism hotspot look like? First and foremost, its regime is a human 
rights abuser. Countries whose governments commit higher levels of human rights 
violations and use physical oppression against their citizens and residents experi-
ence, on average, five times the level of terrorism of countries with better human 
rights records, and they see their nationals commit attacks abroad at four and a half 
times the rate of their less abusive counterparts. No other factor is such a reliable 
predictor of terrorist activity. It is important to note that an examination of the 
effect of human rights abuses on future terrorism produces similar results: abuse 
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in one year produces higher rates of terrorism in the following year(s). Second, 
such a regime is likely to treat its ethnic and religious minorities poorly. Countries 
that exclude minorities from representation in the government both experience 
domestic terrorist attacks and export terrorism at a rate that is three times that of 
less repressive regimes. Third, countries that are the target of foreign military inter-
vention experience and send abroad approximately triple the number of terrorist 
attacks of countries that do not endure an intervention.  
Neither of the other two factors, economic development and democratiza-
tion, seem to have as strong or significant an effect on the terrorist activity in 
countries, yet both figure prominently in current US counterterrorism policy.27 
Wealthier countries experience more terrorism at home, in line with some of 
the empirical evidence discussed previously. However, wealth only modestly 
decreases the rate of transnational terrorism that countries produce. Countries 
with higher levels of democratic participation than the global median, on the 
one hand, actually experience three times the rate of domestic terrorism of 
those countries that have below-median participation rates. On the other hand, 
increased political participation has essentially no effect on the rate at which a 
country produces transnational terror attacks.
Conclusion
The results of this study have some potential implications for US counterterrorism 
policy. Though the promotion of economic development and democratic reform 
are worthwhile goals in and of themselves, and should figure prominently in US 
foreign policy, we should not consider them to be good tools for reducing ter-
rorism per se. Rather, a more efficacious counterterrorism policy might be the pro-
motion of human rights, the enhancement of civil rights and political integration 
for minority groups, and a more selective application of the use of force abroad.  
The case of Iraq after 2003 is illustrative. As an occupying force, the United 
States orchestrated democratic elections in both 2005 and 2010 and showered 
Iraq with $60 billion in reconstruction and development aid, in the hope 
that these actions would reduce terrorist activity. At the same time, the US 
government assigned a lower priority to the promotion of human rights and 
minority-group enfranchisement, and maintained its military occupation of 
Iraq until 2011. The democratically elected and US-supported government 
of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki excluded the primary sectarian minority, 
Sunni Muslims, from national power and engaged in significant human rights 
abuses, which included torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings by 
Iraqi security forces. Moreover, the fledgling Iraqi government remained heavily 
dependent on US military forces to project internal power. As a result, terrorist 
activity increased in Iraq by 83.6 percent between the 2005 and 2010 elections, 
and has increased by a further 26.6 percent since 2010, rendering Iraq one of the 
most terrorism-ridden countries in the world today.28 v
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Metaphors are universal in human languages and pervasive in 
the language used by national security experts. For instance, power can be “soft,” 
diplomacy can be a “lever,” and war can be a “fog.” Metaphors, when well defined 
and understood, can facilitate communication, but they will create potentially 
dangerous confusion if they are poorly defined or misunderstood. 
An often-used metaphor in national security affairs is that of the Blue actor 
(typically conceived as “us”: the “good guys”), the Red actor (the adversary 
opposed to Blue), and at times, Green actors (unaligned and/or ambivalent 
populations that might be swayed either way); hereafter, we refer to this as the 
BGR metaphor. Green is especially relevant in the context of counterterrorism 
because those we label terrorists emerge from populations that formerly may 
not have had a Blue or Red orientation—they were Green. The individuals who 
swell the ranks of terrorist organizations undergo a process of radicalization that 
transforms someone who may never have thought about Blue into someone who 
is Red. Counterterrorism operators are often thrust into situations where the 
Red actors are obscured within a sea of Green. Being able to discern who in that 
sea is tending toward Red is vital to the operators’ survival and the success of 
their missions. Understanding the causes of terrorism, and developing strategies 
and executing operations to combat terrorists, require an understanding of what 
turns a Green actor Red, and perhaps what can turn a Green actor Blue. 
The Blue-Green-Red metaphor used in counterterrorism and other national 
security arenas, however, is used inconsistently to refer to entities, their proper-
ties, or their processes. The ambiguity in applying this metaphor only creates 
confusion in a domain—counterterrorism—where confusion can be misleading 
and dangerous. The purpose of this paper is to explore what Green means in 
the context of counterterrorism, and what its most effective definition and 
use should be. We also illustrate how the “color” of an entity can be practically 
measured and has significance for counterterrorism strategy and operations. 
The problem we address is that, currently, Green is thought of as (1) an entity 
(Green actors), (2) an orientation (Green is neither an ally nor an opponent of 
Blue or Red), or (3) processes that create Blue and Red actors.1 We demonstrate 
that these multiple definitions confuse what Green is, and by extension, make 
defining Red, and even Blue, difficult. Such confusion can have serious implica-
tions for national security research (i.e., what is or is not Green?) and policy 
(should we be dealing with actors, orientations, or processes?). We conclude by 
showing that the most useful way to think of Blue, Green, and Red is as an ori-
entation to other actors and that, therefore, the color metaphors should not refer 
to an actor or a process. We use an analysis of Afghan insurgent messaging to 
illustrate the implications of the more narrowly defined BGR metaphor for social 
entities relevant to counterterrorism and to show how BGR as an orientation can 
be measured. Our example also highlights the importance of recognizing that 
orientation is a property and makes clear how failure to do so can lead to critical 
national security failures.
TERRORISTS 




MAY NOT HAVE 
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The Historical Use of the BGR Metaphor 
Perhaps the clearest exposition of the BGR metaphor is in a series of RAND reports 
on a computer-based war-gaming simulation called Green Agent, developed in 
the 1980s. The purpose of Green Agent was to “represent non-superpower (third-
country) responses to superpower crises and conflicts.” 2 Here, already, the seeds of 
confusion were sown, because both an entity (the nation-state) and a behavior (its 
response) were being referred to by the metaphor Green. 
Blue and Red in Green Agent represented the diametrically opposed United 
States and Soviet Union, respectively, but there was ambiguity in what the colors 
represented there as well. “The Red and Blue Agents model the decision making 
processes of the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively [italics in 
original].” 3
Clearly, Blue was the United States and Red the Soviet Union, but in this seem-
ingly clear statement, the colors did not really represent these nation-state entities, 
but rather their respective decision processes. Within the first few pages of the 
RAND report, the authors used color to refer to a social entity, an orientation, and 
a process all at once, and the BGR metaphor continues to be used in these multiple 
ways. The conceptual use of the BGR metaphor and its practical application for 
strategy and policy require a clearer definition of what BGR refers to. Failure to do 
so leaves the “what” and the “how” of counterterrorism equally ill-defined. 
BGR as a Property
Treating BGR as a property provides the most scientifically valid, logically co-
herent, and practically useful way to define what each color means. Furthermore, 
treating BGR as a property allows for a more realistic and flexible use of color to 
characterize the competing interests a single group may have and the complex 
ways different groups relate to Blue interests. 
It is important to recognize the relativity of interests, which also underscores the 
importance of identifying the social entities whose interests are being character-
ized. For the national security purposes of a large, pluralistic society such as the 
United States, it is important to characterize Blue as a current interest, policy 
position, or value professed by the US government. First, counterterrorism is a 
state function; therefore, state officials decide what interests they wish to defend 
on behalf of the state and its people. Second, the state represents, but cannot 
embody, all of the varied interests, positions, and values of the American people. 
The United States as a social entity is a swirling mix of its people’s orientations—
mostly Blue, but also many shades of Green, and even some Red—toward their 
government. Third, apart from foundational constitutional principles, the 
interests and values of the US government change to some degree with admin-
istrations, the evolving values of its people, and current geopolitical realities. 
Conceiving BGR as a property can thus make US decision makers aware of these 
changing national interests and their ramifications. 
Red characterizes interests, policies, and values that are, to varying degrees, op-
posed to Blue interests, policies, and values. A single group may not be entirely 
Red toward the United States. In modern interstate relations, China and the 
United States cooperate in some arenas like trade and containment of North 
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Korea, and compete in others like the status of the Senkaku Islands and cyber 
war. In other words, China is not all Red to the United States’ Blue. 
Green is essentially an orientation that is neither Blue nor Red. The closer in 
orientation to US Blue interests, the more Blue-Green it is; the farther from US 
Blue interests, the more Green-Red it is. Thinking of BGR as a continuum rather 
than a fixed status allows analysts to make a more realistic determination of 
just how close or distant another group will be to US Blue interests. In fact, the 
RAND Green Actor simulator actually modeled these continuous states, despite 
its ambiguous definitions.
Each non-superpower is modeled parametrically by Green Agent; 
factors of interest include generalized measures of sociopolitical 
orientation, alliance relations, military strength (including nuclear 
capability), and national decision making character and resolve… 
Each actor’s behavior is characterized along these dimensions. 4
In the domain of counterterrorism, some terrorist groups, such as Hamas, are 
opposed to US allies in their region but do not threaten direct attacks against 
the United States. Others, such as al Qaeda Central, al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS, aka ISIL or 
the Islamic State) have threatened, attempted, or carried out attacks directly 
against the US homeland. In our estimation, these latter groups are a deeper 
Red than Hamas. Similarly, Hezbollah does not currently appear to be plan-
ning any direct attacks on Americans and is even fighting in Iraq against ISIS, 
which is clearly a deep Red enemy of the United States. But Hezbollah is also 
fighting against the Free Syrian Army, a purported US ally, in Syria. In this way, 
Hezbollah is Bluish (or at least Green-Blue) with respect to the US interest of 
defeating ISIS, but Red with respect to the US government’s desire to see Bashar 
al-Assad driven from power in Syria.
Later in this essay, we illustrate one way that color can be measured on a con-
tinuum and why it can be critically important to do so, but for now we want to 
make the point that using the color metaphor for orientation enables strategists, 
planners, and even tacticians to more realistically portray the orientation of 
other groups toward a specific Blue interest. 
Another challenge that counterterrorism presents is how to characterize the 
entities whose orientations need to be measured. The types of organizations that 
pose terrorism threats are remarkably diverse, and in the next section, we offer 
some useful perspectives on them from the field of anthropology. 
IN MODERN  
INTERSTATE  
RELATIONS, 
CHINA IS NOT 
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A Property of What? Social Science Entities Relevant to 
National Security
If BGR is a property, then we must first answer the question “a property of what?” 
because an interest is Blue, Red, or Green only relative to the particular social 
entity that is evaluating it. The original formulation of BGR defined the “what” 
as the nation-state, which was entirely appropriate for modeling the Cold War 
contest between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the orientations of 
most potential allies and enemies. In the context of counterterrorism, however, it 
is necessary to have a taxonomy that can cover the wide range of social organiza-
tions that we label “terrorist.” Currently, such groups may be labeled as terrorists, 
violent non-state actors (VNSAs), or networks, while the leaders of some organi-
zations are referred to as warlords. 5 Each of these classifications of terrorist enti-
ties brings certain insights to the organizations and how they function. Further 
work is necessary, however, to more adequately characterize the organizations 
that are the focus of counterterrorism. 
Standard categories from the field of anthropology can help to accurately describe 
terrorist organizations and lend useful insight into how a Red entity might be 
countered or how a Blue entity might be enabled. The best use of these anthropo-
logical categories is not for static classification, but rather to explore, in conjunc-
tion with other categories (e.g., networks, warlords, VNSAs), how various terrorist 
organizations might function and what their various strengths and weaknesses 
might be. The most relevant anthropological categories for counterterrorism are 
tribes, chiefdoms, and states. 
Tribes
Anthropological characterizations of kin-based societies are especially relevant 
to US policy given recent deployments of the US military in regions where 
kin-based societies are the norm. Tribes are kin-based societies, usually formed 
from an alliance of several lineages (extended families) that cooperate for 
mutual defense. 6 Tribes have recognized leaders, usually labeled “headmen” by 
anthropologists, and sometimes differentiate between the more administratively 
and judicially responsible “peace chiefs” and the “war chiefs” who organize raids. 
While headmen and these chiefs enjoy some innate authority by virtue of their 
position, they gain functional authority primarily through leading by example. 
Because of the competing interests of allied lineages, tribes tend to be unstable 
and can effectively disappear in the absence of greater outside threats. For ex-
ample, the Haqqani network, with its strong roots in the Zadran tribe within the 











operates jihadist, criminal, and other enterprises along the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border.7 Because tribal leaders typically lead by example, they are particularly 
vulnerable to being killed by tribal enemies. 8 The instability of tribes also makes 
characterizing their orientation to US interests difficult because there is no central 
authority in a position to dictate the terms of the relationship. In other words, 
tribes should not be regarded as monolithic entities. Instead of trying to discern 
a single orientation for a tribe, it would be better to identify competing factions 
within the tribal structure and attempt to monitor their particular orientations. 
Chiefdoms
Chiefdoms are larger kin-based societies, ultimately derived from tribal conflict 
where a particular tribe comes to dominate other tribes.9 Chiefdoms have clear 
rulers who often claim to rule by divine right. Chiefs have coercive power and 
use it to extract tribute from sub-chiefs (often the headmen of dominated tribes). 
Chiefs then redistribute their wealth strategically to loyal sub-chiefs and subjects. 
Many groups whose leaders are labeled warlords may be similar to chiefdoms, 
especially if they retain kin as the basis for membership and if the warlord-leader 
fulfills a chief ’s redistributive function. A chief ’s ability to redistribute wealth 
and access to power is vital to the chief ’s own hold on power, which means that 
interference with these flows of patronage directly affects not only a chief ’s ability 
to function but the very stability of the organization (in this case, the chiefdom). 
Because chiefs and warlords often hold authoritative power over their subjects, it 
may be more feasible to measure a chiefdom’s orientation by focusing on the chief 
or warlord’s views of Blue interests.
States
States are large organizations that require governance by a class of administra-
tors—or bureaucrats—to run the affairs of state, and a formal system of taxation 
for supporting this bureaucracy.10 Most, if not all, terrorist organizations repre-
sent social entities that are not states. Organizations characterized as terrorists 
typically disrupt but fail to govern.11 Consequently, the tools that are effective 
for understanding terrorist entities are different from those that are used to 
analyze hostile states. The more state-like a terrorist organization is, however, 
the more likely it is to have official organs for disseminating its views, and these 
sources (such as official speeches by leaders, or press releases from spokesmen) 
provide valuable information for evaluating the organization’s orientation to 
Blue policies and interests. 
Our research suggests that these three anthropological categories can be used 
along with other social science categories, such as networks, warlords, pirates, 
and traffickers, to provide a richer characterization of terrorist organizations and 
their factions and aid in evaluating these groups’ strategic orientations.
Example: Measuring the Color of an Entity 
Identifying the “what”—the type of social group that has an orientation toward 
a US interest—is a necessary step in deciding what US policy should be toward 
that organization. However, the critical question remains: How is that group 
(or individual for that matter) oriented toward a US interest, and how strongly? 
In this section, we use a case study of Pashtun mujahedeen to illustrate a method 
by which this can be done and demonstrate that such a study is not only possible 
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but also well within the current capabilities of US government resources and the 
brain trust of the nation. 
Thematic analysis is a method that identifies language that resonates with an 
audience.12 Rhetorical devices are ways of using language to amplify a positive or 
negative sentiment that is expressed toward a group or individual. Examples of 
such rhetorical devices include repetition, hyperbole, and the use of metaphors.13 
Co-author Kuznar has developed an approach to thematic analysis that yields a 
metric of positive “in-group” and negative “out-group” sentiment as expressed 
through language by multiplying the number of times an issue (or group) is 
mentioned in a text by the number of rhetorical devices used in conjunction 
with that issue, normalized for document length. We applied this metric to data 
gathered in a study of Afghan Pashtun mujahedeen writings from the Soviet oc-
cupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989) and Taliban writings from 2010.14 Soviet-
era writings were represented by 27 articles and poems published in the journals 
Qalam and Qiyami Haq. These journals were published in Pakistan for a Pashto-
speaking Afghan audience and were intended to inspire mujahedeen fighters.15 
Taliban writings were represented by the online journals Elham, Shahamat, 
Tanveer, and Srak, published in 2010 for a Pashtun audience and intended to 
inspire Taliban fighters and encourage popular resistance to the International 
Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). Shahamat is the Taliban’s official website and 
continues to remain active.
In this paper, we focus on only those documents in which a Pashtun author 
mentioned US groups in order to illustrate how Pashtun fighters have oriented 
toward the United States and its interests. There were 16 documents in the 
corpus (15 Taliban, one mujahedeen) that mentioned at least one of three US 
groups (US military forces, the US government, or the American people). The 
United States was viewed negatively in all cases, but to differing degrees. In 
these writings, American forces were often referred to as “enemies” (dushman/
dukhman), “invaders” (yarghalgar), and “attackers” (ishgalgar), all of which carry 
strong connotations of invaders who are both unclean and unjust to Pashtun 
readers. The writers also used rhetorical devices (such as repetition, in particular 
of pejorative terms like dushman) to reinforce their audience’s negative senti-
ment toward US forces.16
The median, minimum, and maximum 
sentiment scores expressed toward the 
three US groups are depicted on the BGR 
heat map in Figure 1. 
It is important to realize that, in 2010, the 
Taliban were not as monolithically Red 
as they were typically characterized by US 
media and government officials but ex-
pressed a range of sentiments from mildly 
Red to extremely Red. This nuance dem-
onstrates how operationalizing BGR can 
provide a more accurate representation of 
views toward Blue interests. Operational-
izing BGR can also expose critical failures 
in a decision maker’s perception of others’ 
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policy, the Afghan mujahedeen would have been considered Blue. At least one 
Pashtun tribesman in our corpus, however, expressed extremely Red sentiment 
toward the United States at a time when Washington was actively supporting 
his cause.17 Figure 1 and the data manipulations behind it demonstrate that 
measuring BGR is possible.
Understanding the “what” of these organizations enhances our appreciation of 
the significance of their orientations toward US interests. The mujahedeen were 
in the process of driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan in 1989, and while most 
were still tribally based, the mass influx of arms during the war actually eroded 
many traditional tribal institutions as warlords and their entourages amassed 
power through the control and use of arms, at the expense of chiefs and tribal 
leaders.18 Arguably, the Taliban has existed as a network of tribal warlords since 
their regime was toppled in 2001 by allied forces. The Taliban’s capacity for 
violence is clear to us today. Perhaps the danger that the mujahedeen posed for 
US forces could have been appreciated back in 1989, had Pashtun orientations 
toward the United States been empirically measured on a BGR scale.
Conclusion
In this essay, we suggest a narrow definition of BGR that clarifies what the 
metaphor means, and a way to empirically measure political orientation 
using BGR that can facilitate sound decision making for national security. In 
counterterrorism, it is imperative that analysts understand the diverse forms of 
social organization that VNSAs may take, from loose networks of like-minded 
individuals to tribal entities, warlords, and proto-states. These forms imply 
differences in the ways that groups and organizations develop their orientations 
toward Blue. Once the types of organizations are identified, a close analysis of 
the language members use in public and private messages enables the analyst to 
identify group concerns and measure how strongly members feel about those 
concerns. The position a group takes and the strength of its members’ sentiment 
define how closely it is aligned with US (Blue) interests. 
The current situation on the Arabian Peninsula is an example of why such a 
nuanced, but empirically measurable, BGR metaphor is necessary. The variety 
of non-state actors in the region ranges from tribal groups (Sunni sheikhs and 
their constituents in Anbar) and criminal networks that buy ISIS oil, to religious 
groups (the Houthis of Yemen), jihadist networks (al Qaeda in the Arabian Pen-
insula, the Nusra Front), and state-like organizations such as ISIS and Hezbollah, 
to name only a few of the hundreds of groups that are destabilizing the region. 
Many of these groups have interests that are very localized, and their loyalties 
shift easily depending on how closely their interests align with those of others. 
A consistent application of the BGR metaphor to interests rather than entities 
would make it easier for analysts to realistically characterize the orientation of 
these many groups to US interests and support cogent decision making.  v 
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The Ecosystem of Dark Networks:  
A Biological Perspective
Dr. Matthew M. Mars, University 
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University of Arizona, and  
Dr. Patricia L. Sullivan, University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Organizations increasingly belong to complex networks 
that enable them to work together in support of shared and complementary 
goals. To understand this trend, scholars, policy makers, and leaders regularly 
seek new viewpoints from which to explore the conditions and complexities 
associated with human networks and organizational systems. Sociologists have 
developed a range of analytical models for identifying actors and organizations 
within formal and informal systems, and for explaining the various relational 
ties that link these organizations together.1 Social network analysis (SNA) has 
been used to describe the formation of and communication patterns within 
and between terrorist cells, as well as to predict the outcomes of particular cell 
activities.2 Many questions remain, however. Organizational scientists have 
begun to recognize the power of biological concepts to explain the dynamics 
that foster and sustain linkages between actors and organizations.3 Here, we 
look to the field of ecosystem ecology for insights into the conditions, relational 
dynamics, and complexities that underpin and sustain violent non-state actor 
(VNSA) networks.
We are not the first to turn to biology in an attempt to understand the factors 
that shape and influence organized violence. For example, Darwinian evolution 
has been used to frame the challenges nation-states face when responding to 
rapidly changing strategies deployed by terrorist groups and networks.4 We do 
not aim here to apply a grand biological theory to the overarching problem of 
violence and instability. Instead, we focus on identifying and describing certain 
parallels between biological ecosystems and human networks. In doing so, we 
challenge common assumptions about the nature of militant group networks, 
and propose a new framework for investigating the broader implications of 
removing particular militant groups from violent conflict systems. 
We first introduce biological ecosystems and the concept that “keystone species” 
exist within them. We note the diversity of outcomes that have been observed 
once keystone species are removed, as well as the difficulties of identifying key-
stones in non-disrupted ecosystems. Next, we describe how these concepts can 
be applied profitably to human networks (i.e., organizational ecosystems), which 
we extend to militant networks. Finally, we offer three possible implications of 
modeling violent conflict systems as ecosystems. While we do not argue for a 
complete parallel with biological systems, we contend that a framework that can 
explain patterns and processes in nature offers an exciting lens through which to 
view the sociological underpinnings of violent instability.
Biological Principles
Ecology is the study of the relationships between organisms and the biological 
and non-biological components of their natural environments. Ecologists con-
sider natural systems to be organized in a nested structure. In a given locale, there 
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antagonistic or cooperative interactions among groups of species (communities), 
and interactions among communities and the non-biological environment (e.g., 
air, water, and sunlight). We refer to these latter units as biological ecosystems to 
distinguish them from human organizational structures, networks, and systems, 
which we refer to as organizational ecosystems.  
Ecosystems can be characterized as follows: First, they consist of a set of “nodes” 
within which multiple players function and interact. Second, these nodes are 
linked to each other by flows of information and resources. Third, not every 
node is linked to every other node; links may vary in strength and can impart 
positive, neutral, or negative effects. Fourth, nodes grow and shrink over time; 
they can be lost without the ecosystem as a whole necessarily being lost. Fifth, 
and most importantly for our argument, no “designer” exists; nodes and links 
emerge from the bottom up and either persist or fail based in part on the links 
that emerge among them. Thus, all ecosystems are dynamic. In the next section, 
we argue that human networks can be treated as ecosystems when they exhibit 
these same five features. 
In biological ecosystems, nodes are different species (i.e., each node is a collective 
of individuals of the same species). Biological ecosystems can contain hundreds 
or even thousands of species, but certain species—keystone species—play outsized 
roles in structuring them. Generally speaking, keystone species are those whose 
removal can be expected to have exceptionally strong effects on other members 
of the community, and hence on the functioning of the ecosystem as a whole.5
Who are the keystone actors within a biological ecosystem? Intact systems are 
valuable, and it clearly would be a bad idea to answer this question by removing 
species to see what happens. For this reason, extensive research has been devoted 
to developing tools that allow one to evaluate objectively the relative impact 
of species on their neighbors. Some of these, such as measures of “interaction 
strength,” are based on quantifiable traits of putative keystones.6 Network 
analysis has also been adapted in ways that permit putative keystones to be 
identified.7 Although all of these approaches have drawbacks, cumulatively 
they may make it possible to objectively rank the relative importance of 
different species for maintaining ecosystem structure and function.8 In the 
near future, researchers may be able to identify species whose removal can be 
expected to have the most profound effects.
One of the clearest results from ecosystem 
studies is that the removal of individual 
species can have a surprisingly wide 
range of effects. For example, natu-
ralist Robert Paine showed that the 
removal of a species of California 
coastal starfish from a section of habitat resulted in 
explosive growth in the population of its two prey species, a mussel and 
a limpet.9 Eventually, the mussel, the better competitor for space, excluded 
the limpet. Hence, counterintuitively, removal of a predator led to the 
local disappearance of a species that it ate. This starfish is a classic 
keystone and indeed was the first species de-
scribed using that name. This same star-
fish does not, however always assume 
a keystone role within its community. 












to show that it is only on wave-exposed rocky shores that 
starfish control diversity in the manner Paine described.10 
More generally, a goal of ecologists is to understand how, 
when, and why the effects of keystone removal depend on 
the local setting.
Ecosystem Science and Militant Networks
Matthew Mars, Judith Bronstein, and Robert Lusch 
outlined the primary similarities and differences between 
biological and organizational ecosystems.11 Some of 
these are particularly relevant to debates over strategies 
for eliminating militant groups and disrupting terrorist 
networks. In this section, we briefly introduce and 
contextualize ecological principles that we believe have 
application to the counterterrorism effort.  
Like biological ecosystems, 
organizational ecosystems 
exhibit a nested structure. In 
organizational ecosystems, the 
linked nodes are different groups of 
humans. In the context of the po-
litical violence we are addressing, 
the nodes consist of VNSAs, a 
term we use interchangeably with 
armed opposition groups and 
militant groups. Although there 
are important differences in the 
way these terms are used in various 
literatures, the argument we are 
making is generalizable to a broad 
class of non-state organizations that 
use organized violence in opposition to the established 
political order. As in biological ecosystems, militant group 
nodes are linked by flows of information and resources, 
typically operational intelligence and finances. Interac-
tions between and among armed opposition groups form 
militant networks (communities), and interactions among 
these groups and the larger environment—both natural 
and human constructed (e.g., government institutions)—
form the violent conflict ecosystem.
The fifth characteristic of ecosystems—the serendipitous 
nature of their emergence—is central to the approach 
we propose. Although most terrorism scholarship has 
focused on individual, group, and dyadic-level analyses, 
scholars have begun to apply organizational theory and 
SNA to study terrorist collectivities.12 To our knowledge, 
however, these approaches have not applied ecosystem 
ecology’s crucial insight that biological ecosystems are 
emergent, as opposed to purposefully designed. This, we 
argue, provides a powerful representation of the nature of 
“dark networks.” 
While humans, unlike other species, have the capacity to 
intentionally and strategically design complex systems, 
many organizational ecosystems, like their biological 
counterparts, emerge organically. This is especially likely 
to be true of systems composed of illicit organizations. 
Individuals may deliberately create and rationally design 
militant groups as organizations of individuals to achieve 
a collective goal. Leaders of these organizations may also 
attempt to forge connections to like-minded groups and 
create larger structures intended to increase the effective-
ness and resilience of a movement. But networks of 
extralegal VNSAs face many barriers to sustaining complex 
systems for collective action toward long-term goals. Un-
like legal organizations, militant groups are not embedded 
within institutional settings that can enforce contracts; 
they do not benefit from the norms and institutions that 
allow legal organizations to 
overcome barriers to collec-
tive action and make credible 
commitments. Due to the 
clandestine nature of their 
activities, violent opposition 
groups also face constraints on 
their ability to communicate 
with other groups, monitor the 
behavior of other actors, and 
develop reputations for honesty 
or reliability. The volatility of 
violent conflict systems lowers 
the expectation of repeated 
interaction, and therefore 
reciprocity, thus obviating 
effects that can sometimes facilitate cooperation among 
self-interested actors. 
Implications for Counterterrorism
Given that VNSA systems emerge and evolve as a result 
of myriad lower-level interactions among groups and 
that militant groups are primarily motivated to ensure 
their own survival rather than to protect and enhance the 
collective condition of the system, a biological ecosystem 
framework may have more explanatory and predictive 
power than SNA. Taking an approach derived from biology 
challenges core assumptions from the academic and prac-
titioner literature on political violence. Below, we develop 
three key implications of the biological ecosystem analogy 
for counterterrorism.
First, VNSA ecosystems are likely to follow patterns dis-
tinct from, and more complex than, the ones we observe 
among social networks that comprise licit organizations. 
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(or transitivity) hypothesize that only certain patterns 
of positive (affect) and negative (enmity) ties can exist 
among three nodes… Essentially, the friend of my friend 
is my friend, and the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” 13 
But a glance at the ever-shifting constellation of alliances, 
mergers, splits, and rivalries among militant groups in 
the Middle East and Central Asia quickly reveals that 
interactions among groups frequently violate this pattern. 
Militant groups may cooperate for a time, even if many of 
their long-term strategic objectives are incompatible, as 
long as all groups believe the relationship increases their 
own power and prestige or advances a short-term goal. 
Alliances dissolve and groups split as soon as severing 
ties with, competing with, or even preying upon a former 
ally becomes advantageous, regardless of shared ideolo-
gies or stated objectives. In Iraq and Syria, for example, 
the past decade has seen the rise and fall of at least one 
hundred Sunni militant groups claiming to represent the 
same population and pursuing 
closely aligned strategic objectives. 
Despite their shared interests and 
the obvious benefits of collabora-
tion, the Islamic State first allied 
itself with and then became a 
rival of Ansar al-Islam; al Qaeda 
Central broke ties with the Islamic 
State, whose leader had pledged a 
loyalty oath to Osama bin Laden 
in 2004; and the Nusra Front, 
which initially aligned itself with 
al Qaeda against the Islamic State, 
may now be abandoning its affilia-
tion with al Qaeda.14 
Second, militant group networks 
are likely to be more volatile and less resilient than other 
social networks. There has been increasing interest in, 
and concern about, cooperation among terrorist groups 
in what is sometimes referred to as a global jihadi threat. 
Just as in nature, however, the mere existence of a net-
work is not sufficient evidence of a healthy, functional, 
and persistent ecosystem.15 Terrorism scholar Martha 
Crenshaw observes that “the global jihadist ‘movement’ is 
actually extremely fractured.” 16 Accordingly, the apparent 
momentum of the jihadist movement, as signaled by esca-
lating acts of terror and newly forged alliances, does not 
necessarily indicate a strong, organized, and stable system 
of global terrorism. Rather, illicit networks are prone to 
spontaneous failures when they come under stress as a 
result of insurmountable collective-action problems and 
security vulnerabilities.17 Attempts by the leaders of VNSA 
groups to forecast future conditions and strategically 
design the larger system of connections among groups to 
increase the odds of a broader movement’s effectiveness 
and survival are unlikely to be sustainable over time. 
We should not expect to see militant groups designing 
resilient networks to advance a common cause, because 
illicit actors cannot credibly commit to upholding 
bargains when component groups could benefit from 
unilateral defection. Analyst Chad Serena maintains that 
between 2003 and 2008, the Iraqi insurgency created 
a tremendous amount of chaos and terror but failed to 
achieve its primary strategic objectives—overthrowing 
the central government and pushing coalition forces 
out of the country—because, without a centralized, 
hierarchical leadership, discord and competition among 
the multitude of militant organizations that made up the 
insurgency limited the network’s ability to coordinate 
activities toward a common purpose. Serena notes that 
“being decentralized and networked is really effective only 
in the short term or if minimalist 
organizational goals are sought.” 18
Third, the ecosystem-level effects 
of eliminating a node within the 
system, especially a suspected 
keystone, should not be ignored. 
As described above, the removal 
of a keystone species is expected 
to jeopardize the persistence of 
a biological ecosystem. Hence, 
the goal in biology is to retain 
the putative keystones. Conflict 
ecosystems also have keystone 
actors—militant groups, state 
sponsors, or financiers—whose 
removal has stronger effects on the 
system than the removal of other less critical actors. The 
goal in this case, one might presume, would be to eliminate 
the putative keystones. 
Keystone removal could be central to a strategy for 
reducing or preventing acts of organized violence. There 
are, in fact, multiple studies that attempt to determine 
whether, and under what conditions, leadership decapita-
tion degrades or destroys terrorist groups.19 The assump-
tion is that eliminating a violent extralegal organization 
will decrease violent attacks and have a net positive effect 
on human security in regions plagued by militant activity. 
As highlighted earlier, however, ecosystem scientists 
have discovered that keystone actors are not easy to 
identify a priori. In the context of conflict ecosystems, as 
in biological ecosystems, keystone actors may not in fact 
be the most public figures, the most lethal actors, or the 









keystone elimination on a system that has emerged from interactions among a 
multitude of individuals, groups, governments, and their environments is largely 
unknown. Just as in biological ecosystems, the removal of keystone actors from 
violent conflict systems can result in a variety of outcomes. The United States 
and its allies achieved a large measure of success in disrupting and dismantling al 
Qaeda Central, but consequently (and unintentionally) facilitated the rise of the 
Islamic State. The removal of Libya’s leader Muammar el Qadafi, a longtime foe 
of the United States and a state sponsor of terrorism against Western interests, 
likewise created an opening for the Islamic State to gain a foothold in Libya. 
The 2007 coalition surge in Iraq exacerbated organizational cleavages and 
severely degraded the operational capacity of key nodes—both individuals 
and groups—of the Iraqi insurgent network. These tactical successes limited 
the insurgency’s ability to achieve its long-term strategic goals but also likely 
resulted in an escalation of random, chaotic violence—often primarily victim-
izing civilians—and made the enemy less predictable.20 While removing a 
keystone (whether a group or a specific leader) eliminates acts of violence by 
that actor, we have not yet developed systematic methodologies for identifying 
keystone actors or predicting the system-wide effects of eliminating individuals 
and groups. 
Conclusion
There are many potential applications of ecosystem models, but we are particu-
larly excited about the potential for applying principles discovered by ecologists 
studying the effects of species extinction to develop testable hypotheses about the 
effects of eliminating particular militant groups within the VNSA organizational 
ecosystem. There are a number of crucial questions that could be explored using 
this framework. In the context of a region with multiple militant groups (pur-
suing a variety of goals, sometimes competing and sometimes cooperating, some 
more directly threatening to the United States than others, some using more 
brutal tactics than others), what traits identify groups that play a keystone role 
within the broader violent conflict ecosystem? How would eliminating a par-
ticular group affect the intensity of violence within the system as a whole? What 
are the effects—both beneficial and detrimental—on other VNSA nodes within 
the system and on the system as a whole? What other qualities of the broader en-
vironment condition the consequences of eliminating an actor within the system? 
There has been a tendency in both academic and policy circles to focus on the 
effectiveness of strategies designed to disrupt and destroy militant organizations 
while ignoring the wider system-level effects of eliminating any particular actor 
within the system. But counterterrorism strategists should be concerned with the 
potential unintended consequences of eliminating militant groups, as removing 
one node from a system clearly can have a wide range of effects. v
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America: Imagined Community, Imagined 
Kinship
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Kinship drives culture, and cultural rules shape society. 
National community in modern times is shaped by imagined kinship and the 
need for collective belonging and identity. Modern nations construct kinship 
through the belief that all citizens are related, and thus committed, to one 
another, and the state itself becomes the central meditative and celebratory 
agent for the affirmation of national kinship, especially in war. This core dynamic 
of modern society—the process of building imagined kinship—is projected 
outward through a nation’s relations with other societies, whether they are 
peaceful or hostile. The nation most dependent on invented kinship as the basis 
of its politics is the United States, and this characteristic confers both advantages 
and limitations for the conduct of foreign policy.
The advantage of invented kinship is that Americans can theoretically pick 
and choose both whom in the world we call kin and the importance that their 
kinship has for our national identity. The limitation of invented kinship is that 
America’s ties of kinship to other societies have a life of their own, waning or 
deepening over historical time.1 At present, the United States faces a global 
smorgasbord of kinship needs and clinging legacies, a feast of opportunities and 
obligations it can neither completely swallow nor walk away from. 
Imagined kinship is the foundation of national community. It is the cultural 
process that permits people in a national society to believe collectively that they 
belong to each other—that they are part of the same kinship construct—even 
though most of them are likely to be strangers to each other. Imagined community 
also makes the state the trusted manager of this process, powerfully affirming 
our connection and commitment to each other in, for example, a time of war. 
Thus, the collective kinship construct is essential to the very idea of a modern 
nation-state.
Yet this thought departs radically from the traditional idea of the state as initially 
developed by political “theorists” in early Victorian times. In the late nineteenth 
century, just prior to the world wars of the early twentieth century, the nation 
could not be conceived as anything like a cultural construct. How could such 
an overwhelming force as the nation—this great living reality that completely 
enveloped and defined the lives of its citizens—be no more than people’s own 
expressions of mere collective belief ? 
The “nation-state” of that time was the ultimate cultural expression: fully real, 
a living thing, and a force of nature. We belonged to it only by continuously 
reaffirming our loyalty and allegiance, as exemplified by the daily recitation of 
the Pledge of Allegiance in American public schools.2 Nation-states apparently 
existed as entities wholly outside of their citizens: we petitioned to be part of 
them. Even if we were a microcosmic part of them, they nonetheless had their 
own inherent consciousness. The state was the head (the English words capital 









CTX | Vol. 5, No. 3
“body politic.” 3 Political theorists further declared that this entity had a will of 
its own as well: “Nations have interests,” they all intoned. Who was to question 
such postulation? The nation exists, it speaks and acts, and what it says and 
does—in the form of policy and strategy—is therefore in the pure pursuit of the 
“national interest.” 
By the time political theorist Benedict Anderson first described his theory of the 
nation in 1983, many big wars had chipped away at nation-state authority. An-
derson used a cultural construct, community as a form of kinship, to describe the 
nation as an “imagined community.” 4 How is it imagined? Anderson explained, 
“It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds 
of each lives the image of their communion.” 5 
Think of the nation and its state as just such an inhabitation, a kind of architec-
ture: peoples as nations, each in a great edifice managed by the state, look out 
across a larger global reality. But these national architectures of constitution 
and institution collectively have fashioned something no more “real” in itself 
than the boundary membrane holding our collective belief, which is belief in its 
reality. Together, from generation to generation, people of all nations spend the 
energies of their lives sustaining the ongoing harvest and ever more bountiful 
treasure of this imaging of themselves, the fulfillment that comes from belonging 
to one another, from being a part of something grand and giving and human: 
a nation. We may have made such imaging real, but its reality is still sustained 
only by our belief in one another. Nations remain together, and belong together, 
because people believe, at some level, that they are a clan, a tribe, a family. 
Human imagination is very big. When we were just a gaggle of human bands in 
constant peril on the great savannas of the Serengeti, we recognized each other 
only by our blood relations. Five million years later, we “know” each other—just 
as surely as we imagine reality itself—when we embrace as fellow Russians or 
Italians or Americans. 
The nation is indeed a wonder: citizens can act toward other citizens like brothers, 
but at the same time also make incredible collective sacrifices in wartime. In the 
French Revolution and the wars of Napoleon Bonaparte, Frenchmen fought with 
unprecedented frenzy for the ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité. 6 We also see this 
fraternal energy in the fated French poilus in World War I, loyal soldiers who 
obediently continued to serve even as the state bled the nation nearly to death. 
But if the nation, however amazing and wondrous, is simply a collective human 
artifact, then the nation-state is a construct within a construct. The state, argu-
ably, is even more dependent on conscious collective loyalty than is the nation, 
its mother. 
This judgment has been proven throughout modernity—the epoch of the 
nation-state. Nations since 1789 have overturned state regimes and their estab-
lishments by the hundreds. Hence, it is understandable, even necessary, that the 
state accomplish three things to ensure its perpetuity. First, it must cement the 
conviction that the nation and its state form a unitary body, which the state rules 











that is necessary only to support the ruling life and thought of the head.7 Second, 
the state must arrange the civic—even the daily personal life—of the nation so 
that it is always ritually and symbolically reminded in public display that the 
body serves the state’s sacred vision (again, the US Pledge of Allegiance is a prime 
example).8 Finally, the state must seize constitutional power to claim the lives of 
its citizens in times of crisis, so that such authority over the body, however the 
idea is sold politically, is understood by all citizens to rest with the state.
The imagined community template for the nation tells us several things:
 ¡ First, the nation is a construct or artifact, but it is nonetheless a pas-
sionate artifact.
 ¡ Second, imagined kinship creates emotional ties as powerful as blood 
relations.
 ¡ Third, the state uses such passion and its controlling power to dominate 
society.
What Does Imagined Kinship Mean for the United 
States of America?
The United States is perhaps the ultimate imagined community, 
in two senses. First, its own identity self-consciously celebrates an 
American kinship that is dependent on people who have come here 
from other places. But, importantly, they have come here to join “us,” 
to commit themselves to the American Idea. This means that they have 
renounced their former kinship with another community to become 
Americans. Second, American kinship—becoming one of us—requires a 
public act. This act is a civic-religious ritual in which the prospective 
new citizens (or originally, the colonists) both renounce 
their former identities and swear to embrace the American 
nation through a sacred oath.9 Thus, the United States is 
a fully self-conscious community in the sources and au-
thority of its imagined kinship. You are a fellow national 
if you swear the oath. Nothing else is required, and I will 
die together with you in battle as my fellow American.
The United States is one of the few national communi-
ties that lays existential terms of kinship right on the 
table. Moreover, this existential postulate of national 
identity is extravagantly reaffirmed, for example, 
in every American war movie, because each film is 
integral and, in effect, a restated paean to the national 
liturgy.10
The rest of this essay focuses on the American 
existential use of national kinship to construct its 
closest relations with other societies. What it shows 
is that US relations with the world are far from 
the postulates of the realist school of international 
relations theory, but are in fact driven by a desire to 
replicate kinship terms of relationship as they evolved 
within the American polity.
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What Is Kinship?
Anthropologists describe kinship as a complex affair. Imagined or, better still, 
invented kinship is yet more sublime, and its terms are undefined.11 Kinship 
as a concept central to the national polity and relations between states is still 
only partly acknowledged, and hotly debated, within the field of international 
relations.12
American identity depends on explicit kinship rituals and symbols. This stands 
in contrast to nations whose kinship is built on old roots like language and 
religion, in which belonging historically antedates the nation itself and certainly 
the state. These kinds of ancient bonds can make extending kinship to other soci-
eties, even to new citizens, difficult. The United States, in contrast to these older 
nations, is free to make kinship integral to its world relationships. Moreover, kin-
ship can be almost wholly invented through the political arena. Anointing other 
nations as “relations” requires no more than identifying ties that establish the 
kinship bond. After that, we can rely on media to marshal the needed celebra-
tory public rituals and symbols to cement the bond in our emotional gut. 
The United States has established kinship relations with other societies through 
five alternative paths.
1. Kinship as fraternal vision. Kinship here revolves around two words 
sacred to the American ethos: freedom (originally, liberty) and democracy. 
First invoked with the French after 1789, this nascent international 
kinship also led to the new US republic’s first kinship split, between the 
Jeffersonians, who favored France, and the Hamiltonians, who favored 
Britain.13 In the twentieth century, non-Americans also learned to wield 
the fraternal-vision card to build up the alliance-worthiness of Britain, 
making much of its parliamentary democracy as they pushed the United 
States to take Britain’s side in the world wars.14 Today, Israel is constantly 
repeating the mantra that it remains “the Middle East’s only democracy.” 
In 2014, Ukraine tried to leverage antigovernment protests in Kiev’s 
Maidan Nezalezhnosti to the same purpose.15
2. Kinship as tribal tie. Blood ties have always had a powerful pull in the 
establishment of global kinship ties, but with this caveat: the heart beats 
strongly only for those of the blood. Hence, for example, many Boston 
Irish wanted the US government to fully back the Irish Republican Army 
in its fight for independence from Britain, but they ended up having to 
fund their own campaign. Likewise, African-Americans lobbied hard 
for the League of Nations to free Ethiopia from its Italian invaders in 
1935, but to no avail against a generally racist US electorate.16 Yet race 
and blood kinship have worked triumphantly for the cause of Israel, and 
not within the American Jewish community alone. It was an imagined 
kinship felt by Christian evangelicals that turned the tide of US policy in 
favor of Israel in the 1980s.
3. Kinship as mission. “Succor the afflicted; champion the oppressed.” This 
credo is the invented kinship of a particularly American mission rooted 
in divine redemption—the congregational community of the saved. 
When President Abraham Lincoln posited this cause at the end of the 
US Civil War, “the Negro” went from being chattel to being a brother 










during the early nineteenth-century Protestant revival in the United 
States known as the Second Great Awakening, and it is a tradition that 
has since been repurposed in the pursuit of world relations. We saw it in 
the mid-twentieth century when US troops were sent to war to save part 
of Korea from communism, and we see it today in the American bond 
with the Kurds. However, invented ties served US interests poorly in 
Vietnam, and they were perhaps most cynically paraded in US President 
George H.W. Bush’s sympathy-bid to free Kuwait from its Iraqi invaders 
in 1990. Such can be the pressure to invent and demonstrate kinship in 
foreign policy.17 
4. Kinship as parental responsibility. If there is no more powerful kinship 
obligation than parent to child, then the United States made its strongest 
kinship claim in Asia. Imperial paternalism, a concept coined by Wil-
liam Howard Taft when he served as governor-general of the Philip-
pines, was unfortunate from the start.18 Yet the codependent bond that 
infuses both sides of a paternalistic relationship could still be reciprocal, 
as with America’s continuing ties to the Philippines. The United States’ 
relationship with prerevolutionary China, until 1950, was a blend of 
both the parental and the missionary. Once the Communists took over, 
however, kinship paternalism foreclosed that relationship for 30 years 
and severed longstanding ties. Even so, those ties were so close that, in 
time, they were easily restitched. 
5. Kinship as shared destiny. Geopolitics is about verities, like the axiom 
that power is destiny: it is the fate of powerful nations to compete and 
fight. But Americans also believe in great power kinship. For example, 
in the 1860s, the United States saw imperial Russia as a vaguely 
kindred spirit: both nations were enormous, rough-around-the-
edges, and destined for world greatness. Also, in tandem, the 
US president had freed the slaves just as the Russian czar had 
freed the serfs.19 By the early twentieth century, at the 
end of the Victorian era, Americans began to see Brits 
as brethren rather than old enemies. Naval-power 
advocates like Admiral Alfred Mahan of the 
US Navy and geopoliticians like Britain’s Sir 
Halford MacKinder pushed the vision of 
an Anglo-American destiny in which 
the brother nations would rule 
the future.20 It can be argued 
that their shared vision did 
indeed became a shared 
destiny, borne out in 
World War II and the 
Anglo-American–led 
United Nations.21 More 
recently, the United States 
has embraced the world’s 
largest remaining communist 
regime and former pariah, the People’s 
Republic of China, as a world partner. 
Why do Americans treasure imagined kinship with 
other nations? First, Americans value trust, and what 
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family? Second, the emotional bonds of kinship have the appearance of fraternal 
resilience. So, for example, if our dearest cousins, the Brits, do something that 
seems stupid to us, we may tell them what we think, but then we forgive and 
forget. Such trust is a deep and unspoken premise with the few nations Ameri-
cans feel closest to. Third, kinship makes commitment to other nations less 
dependent on clinical rationalizations of national “interest.” 
Not-Kin as Antiphonal Kinship
Just as imagined kinship hinges on ritual celebrations of connection, “not-kin” is 
an equally imagined form of kinship that relies on similar, but flipped, ritual cel-
ebrations of the evil Other: one who is wholly alien to us, the very opposite of 
kin. Because all humans share the same DNA22 and seek meaning and belonging 
in similar ways, this “otherness” must be posited so strongly that it overrides 
any lingering awareness of common humanity. Positing not-kin is an especially 
powerful strand in the American ethos and manifests itself in five incarnations.
1. Not-Kin as the Dark Side of the Force. The first US president, George 
Washington, invoked the Other for his American audience in his 
farewell address: monarchies are like Satan, he warned, and America is 
not to truck with them.23 In more recent times, Bolsheviks and Nazis be-
came not-kin. Above all, not-kin must be the opposite of what we share: 
not-kin are the inveterate enemies of freedom and democracy. However, 
looking back to 1796, the United States has been cozy with dark princes 
everywhere. Was Yoda right when he warned Luke Skywalker, “If once 
you start down the dark path, forever will it dominate your destiny”?24 
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Among the American political elite, has the Dark 
Side actually won? We can answer only with a 
useful America adage: the jury is still out.
2. Not-Kin as the “Left Behind.” In their renunciation 
of the true path (i.e., freedom and democracy), 
the not-kin are likened to those who deny God 
and are left behind.25 Resistance alone makes them 
enemies of the American idea. Hence, Islamists, 
Russians, and Cubans, for instance, are not simply 
evil but also lost to the paradise of freedom and 
democracy.26 Meanwhile, the saved among them 
who convert and embrace American ideals are a 
living testament to American exceptionalism. 
3. Not-Kin as Pied Piper People.27 On the other side 
of the coin, Americans may perceive not-kin as 
people who, rather than being inherently evil, have 
temporarily been drugged or hypnotized by the 
music of evil. Ideology can 
thus be like the Pied Piper, 
seducing a people without 
their consent. Hence, the 
status of not-kin can rep-
resent a kind of ideological 
halfway house from which a 
people may yet be freed when 
they finally manage to lift the 
veil of their misguided beliefs 
or behaviors. American 
attitudes toward Colombia 
in the 1990s had just this sort 
of lofty ambivalence. We pitied those lashed by the 
drug lords and insurgencies and senatorial militias, 
but the society as a whole seemed to be slipping 
away. The Colombian people had to show us they 
could do better. Pied Piper people are not like left-
behind people: they are still worthy and capable 
of reclamation. They know not what they do. 
There is hope for them, and that hope is America.
4. Not-Kin as Lord of the Flies.28 This path to not-
kinship tells us that a people (implicitly childlike) 
are now beyond our help. This is a kind of dis-
pensation that permits us to throw up our hands 
and do nothing. The United States has invoked 
this dispensation many times in its history—as in 
Afghanistan in the 1990s—and will again. When 
rolling up our sleeves and pitching in to help pull 
a nation together was declared to be the neces-
sary and right thing to do, America never shied 
away from even the most obdurate—many might 
say failed—situations, including Shi’a Iraq and 
what is left of pro-US Afghanistan today. But the 
United States summarily abandoned the very same 
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 
without so much as a backward glance. Americans 
also have no trouble callously shrugging and 
saying: “Not worth our time.”
5. Not-Kin as the Demiurge.29 In this construct of the 
Other as a Manichaean or existential threat, the 
designation of not-kin is a declarative imperative 
according to which an opposing human reality must 
be completely crushed. Recent examples include the 
so-called Islamic State and the many manifestations 
of al Qaeda, Germany and Japan in World War II, 
and the Soviet Union in the early Cold War. But 
declaring such evil creates an impossible problem. 
Such absolute biblical pronouncements demand ac-
tion, and in the American experience, action always 
seems to follow. In other words, you must destroy 
evil, or evil may destroy you.
The not-kin ascription generally 
works as a satisfyingly simple 
classification for American policy 
making purposes, but there are 
two drawbacks to assigning 
not-kin status to nations. First, 
as with the “not-kin as the 
Demiurge” construct above, if we 
cannot destroy or coopt not-kin, 
the American idea begins to lose 
authority. Second, the not-kin 
ascription is inflexible. As US 
President George W. Bush intoned, “You are either with 
us or with the terrorists.” 30
Moreover, not-kin status is like an emotional foreclosure. 
What if we want to reengage an enemy that has changed 
and no longer poses a threat? What if changed circum-
stances make such an association suddenly desirable? Can 
we rule out a US relationship with the Islamic State some-
time in the future? Or with Iran? The necessary emotional 
aspect inherent to not-kin status can foreclose options and 
opportunities in the national interest. This conundrum 
was apparent in the United States’ refusal to acknowledge 
the existence of Red China in the early Cold War.
So how might we best understand the peculiar American 
idea of kinship?
1. Kinship is as much an artifact as national com-
munity. Kinship identification and belief, which 
are tied to deep kinship emotions, are at the core 
of American national belonging. Kinship with 
other nations is simply an extension of the central 
civic investiture in American life—the public 
KINSHIP CAN BE A 
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affirmation of each other as Americans, whether through the sacred 
venues of football and baseball, or an episode of The Simpsons.31
2. Kinship is as important to relationships as “interests.” From the beginning, 
the United States has put kinship ahead of national interest in its world 
relations. At the same time, interest and kinship nearly always find a 
way to work together. This was true in Saudi Arabia, where American 
wildcatters and oilmen forged enduring, tribally intimate links with 
Bedouin leaders such Abdul Aziz in the 1920s and thus opened up vast 
oil fields to exploitation.32 Although the United States seemed to have 
few of the more imperial claims in the Middle East that hung like sordid 
badges on Britain and France, 
these less visible, kinship-like 
connections had all the real 
substance of an imperial client 
relationship in the making. It 
is when special bonds of trust, 
reciprocation, and obligation 
are not present that American 
foreign enterprises are at risk. 
3. Kinship belief can grow or 
wane. When France presented 
the Statue of Liberty to the 
United States in 1886, and 
when the United States fought 
to save France from conquest 
twice in the last century, 
American feelings of kinship 
with that nation were never 
stronger. Yet in the run-up 
to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
French abstention from the 
war led to invectives from 
US media and politicians, 
such as renaming French fries 
“freedom fries.” The last time 
a popular American fast food 
item was angrily renamed was after the United States declared war on 
Germany in 1917, when wieners were renamed “hot dogs,” and sauerkraut 
became “liberty cabbage.” Kinship can be a fickle and emotional embrace.
4. Kinship ties move across cultural dimensions. Italy’s relationship with the 
United States between 1905 and 1950 is a prime example of this dynamic. 
Over those five decades, Italy moved from having a limited tribal tie 
with the United States through emigration (represented by the Knights 
of Columbus and Columbus Day rallies ),33 to sharing a fraternal vision 
(as allies in World War I), to joining the Dark Side of the Force (when 
Mussolini allied with Hitler after 1935), to becoming an afflicted and op-
pressed beneficiary of the American mission (in the latter part of World 
War II), and finally, once again, to marching shoulder-to-shoulder in 
partnership once Italy joined NATO in 1949.
5. Kinship can come to dominate a relationship. The belief that we are all 
related as Americans has deepened. This means that emotional ties to 
other nations have also deepened over time. Kinship can become more 
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and more real, to the point where it dominates national strategy and 
policy considerations. In the early twentieth century, emotional invest-
ment shaped US ties to the British Empire. Even today, this kinship is 
called “the special relationship”: “America has no truer friend than Great 
Britain.” 34 Through this bond, Americans also regard Australians and Ca-
nadians as blood brothers. But the strongest ties can dominate American 
strategy to the exclusion of other “interests,” as the Israeli-American bond 
demonstrates.  
This anthropological concept of kinship is outside mainstream schools like 
realism and geopolitics. Yet a cultural vantage offers something that such 
standard old-school political theory cannot. The understanding of imagined 
kinship unlocks an elemental dimension in the political life of the nation 
that the romantic determinism of Victorian geopolitics and the power-driven 
assumptions of international relations theory have ignored. Overlooking kinship 
as a key dimension in modern state relations has meant turning a blind eye to the 
very sources of the conduct of foreign policy. Given the defining role kinship has 
played in US history, its absence from our national discourse has serious implica-
tions for the study of America’s world relations. v
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Americans were left bewildered in the wake of the Vietnam 
War (1964–1975). “How is it that the ‘greatest power in the world’ could suffer 
defeat at the hands of… [bandits] ‘in black pajamas?’” 1 A phrase, both explana-
tory and palliative, was often proffered for this puzzle: We fought with one arm 
tied behind our backs. The imagery of this term is compelling: a pugilist who 
is struggling not only against an opponent but also against unfair constraints 
has the weapons he needs to win but cannot bring them to bear. Over the last de-
cade, many Americans have found themselves dealing with similarly overwhelm-
ing feelings of frustration. The United States currently spends massive amounts 
of money on national security to produce the most professional and technically 
advanced force the world has ever seen.2 Why, then, does this colossal invest-
ment seem unable to produce desired outcomes against barely trained, meagerly 
resourced, seemingly ad hoc opponents around the world? Does the country 
indeed fight with one arm tied behind its back? 
In this article, we postulate that liberal states are increasingly bound by normative 
limitations on the acceptable uses of force3 and that this effect is exacerbated in 
discretionary wars (i.e., wars of choice). In other words, a state may have a fully 
“combat effective” national security apparatus that it cannot bring to bear due to 
socially constructed norms of acceptable behavior.4 If these points are valid, then 
they have enormous implications for the strategic assessment efforts undertaken 
by a liberal democratic nation engaged in a landscape that consists of noncritical 
threats. A state may have an exceedingly impressive national security apparatus 
that remains “tied behind its back.” Therefore, we suggest that anyone tasked with 
analyzing US power in the current global threat environment must be very sensi-
tive to these points and temper their analysis of US capabilities accordingly.5
We develop this argument in three parts: First, we critically examine the litera-
ture that links investment in military forces to the concept of national power. 
Second, we look at the “arm tied behind the back” puzzle more closely by iden-
tifying increasingly constraining normative expectations on the use of violence. 
Third, we describe the implications of this argument for making realistic assess-
ments of US capacity to successfully engage the current global threat environment. 
In doing so, we show that any net assessment of non-state actor threats must 
be reconsidered to take into account normative constraints on force and avoid 
the danger of miscalculating capacity. We conclude by linking this discussion to 
specific policy concerns and call for new approaches to operations planning.     
Military Force and the Concept of Power
As a starting point, we need to discuss why some nations are regarded as “pow-
erful” and why this concept is considered by many theorists to be paramount 
to the functioning of the international system. It is standard to assume that 
the international system is anarchic.6 If it is true that no higher authority exists 
above system actors, then these actors must secure themselves to survive. The 
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common narrative for this process is that states—the key actors in the global 
system—maintain sovereignty over a given territory and population, from 
which they extract resources and build a military force.7 This ability to leverage 
authority and resources thus determines the relative power of the actors in the 
system.8 The question then is, how is military force linked instrumentally to the 
political fortunes of the state? Despite the myriad weapons and tactics that have 
been utilized across time and space, most scholars agree that actors get utility out 
of military forces through two basic means: their actual use (fighting) or their 
potential use (threatening). In other words, actors either wage war to achieve 
desired outcomes, or they engage in bargaining with implicit or explicit threats 
of war in the background as leverage.9 In fact, for those who profess the world-
view known as Realism, it is the underlying distribution of military power that 
provides the structure necessary for the international system to function at all. 
Lurking behind the scenes, unstated but explicit, lies the military 
muscle that gives meaning to the posturing of the diplomats. … Coer-
cion, therefore, is to a political framework what a political framework 
is to a market: the necessary but not the sufficient precondition for 
its effective functioning.10 
Furthermore, this is frequently assumed to be a positive relationship: “the 
more a state allocates to the military, the stronger it becomes ceteris paribus and 
the more likely it is to prevail in any conflict.” 11 For the Realist, investment in 
military forces promises both victory in war and successful negotiation in peace. 
If this line of reasoning is valid, then the United States today should be able to 
prevail over almost any threat it confronts.12 
Does this parsimonious model seem sound? Or are there conditions under which 
increasing the allocation of resources to the military fails to increase the power 
potential of the state? Critics such as David Baldwin argue that military forces are 
often unable to shape outcomes in the system due to the fact that military forces 
are far less fungible than is commonly believed. This goes beyond the argument 
that resources are being allocated inefficiently (“using the wrong strategy”) but 
says that the instrument of military might itself is simply unusable in many 
arenas of competition. Offering a simple but evocative analogy to illustrate his 
point, Baldwin observes that it is not a case of “‘he had the cards but played 
them poorly,’ but rather, ‘he had a great bridge hand but happened to be playing 
poker.’ ” 13 In other words, weapons and soldiers 
do not radiate an intrinsic and inexorable “power” 
but are instruments whose utility is extremely 
context-dependent. We agree with Baldwin’s 
assessment and focus in the next section on one 
emerging aspect of contextual constraint: norms 
of acceptable behavior. 
Normative Constraints on the Use 
of Force
The Realist argument sketched in the previous 
section is predicated on military force being used 
without constraint, a condition that accords with a 
strict adherence to the assumption of anarchy. Carl 
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von Clausewitz’s early thinking on the topic 
emphasized the unlimited nature of war in 
an anarchic environment where, all things 
being equal, the more extreme application 
of violence would prevail: “The impulse to 
destroy the enemy … is central to the very 
concept of war. … War is an act of force, 
and there is no limit to the application of 
that force.”14 This position was articulated 
almost comically by the colorful Victorian 
British Admiral Sir John “Jacky” Fisher: 
The essence of war is violence! Moderation in war is imbecility! …If 
you rub it in both at home and abroad that you are ready for instant 
war … and intend to be first in and hit your enemy in the belly and 
kick him when he is down and boil your prisoners in oil (if you take 
any) … and torture his women and children, then people will keep 
clear of you.15   
This quote is striking in its anachronistic feel. Such an idea simply could not be 
articulated today by any type of democratic state official (who intends to keep 
his or her job). Why is this the case?16
The “Liberal Dilemma” is a well-documented phenomenon: nations that 
nominally abhor war as a tool of policy must at times engage in it because “the 
role of enlightened reason will not be disseminated throughout the world 
through the peaceful operation of some hidden hand. It needs muscle behind 
it.”17 This tension lies in the liberal state leadership’s need to accomplish policy 
goals while maintaining the popular support necessary to stay in power.18 Thus, 
these leaders must consider the opportunity costs of any potential military 
action. Undertaking military actions that contravene accepted norms can 
create substantial costs and undermine the fortunes of political leadership by 
(1) alienating the global community and inciting international disapproval, and/
or (2) raising domestic disapproval and lowering domestic political support. In 
the first case, a state that is highly integrated into the global community in terms 
of economic activity and international security must consider these international 
norms very carefully because transgressions affect international relationships. 
In the words of political scientist Martha Finnemore, “Force must be coupled 
with legitimacy for maximum effect. … The goal must be seen as legitimate, 
and force must be viewed as a legitimate means to that goal.”19 In the second 
case, the internal political institutions of the democratic state are paramount to 
policy makers. Democratically elected leaders are highly sensitive to maintaining 
a foreign policy that is palatable to their domestic constituents.20 Under such 
circumstances, it follows that norms will be more constraining in liberal states.21 
Constraining norms become even more difficult to observe in discretionary 
“wars of choice.” Lawrence Freedman, a foreign policy and defense expert, 
explains why this is the case.  
When the security of the state is threatened by a large and self-
evidently hostile enemy, then all social and economic resources can 
be mobilized in response. When, by contrast, there is a debate to 
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be had about the nature of the threat and 
whether matters are made better or worse 
by direct military action, military operations 
appear to be more discretionary and national 
mobilisation on even a modest scale becomes 
more difficult.22
In other words, when threats are seeas nonexistential, 
normative constraints loom larger. Domestic constituents 
are willing to bear fewer direct costs, and critics at home 
and abroad are less circumspect in their censure: 
The intervening states’ apparent sympathy for 
the population should lead them to take extra 
precautions to protect it during the prosecu-
tion of the war. . . . On the other hand, if the 
political leaders justify the wars by reference 
to altruistic motives rather than to national 
interest, they may find it difficult to permit 
any unnecessary risk to their own country’s 
soldiers.23          
Thus, liberal countries’ wars of 
choice generate contradictory 
pressures: the need to minimize 
target nation casualties while 
simultaneously minimizing 
their own forces’ casualties, all 
while executing complex and 
demanding missions against a 
relatively unconstrained enemy. 
This point of view is expounded 
most directly by Gil Merom, an 
international security specialist 
who argues that “democracies fail 
in small wars because they find it 
extremely difficult to escalate the 
level of violence and brutality to 
that which can secure victory.” 24 
If this is true, then we can expect 
that liberal states faced with nonexistential threats will 
find it increasingly difficult to gauge their ability to apply 
adequate resources and affect outcomes in the interna-
tional system. We now turn to the difficulties of assessing 
threats and outcomes for liberal democracies.  
The Challenge of Assessment 
The ability to realistically assess potential outcomes is 
a fundamental requirement for actors in an anarchic 
system because bargaining over any issue is done with the 
specter of conflict, however remote, in the background. 
Each actor must regularly calculate how its forces would 
fare in a prospective conflict, a reality that conditions the 
scope of national ambitions, the weighing of recalcitrance 
and acquiescence, and the ultimate choice of whether to 
resort to violence. These positions can be founded only 
on assessments of each actor’s relative power.25 Combined 
with the normative constraints on policy described in the 
previous section, it follows that creating a valid assessment 
scheme for the United States in its current threat environ-
ment is going to be difficult in the extreme. 
Some areas of competition are relatively symmetric and 
straightforward; others can be more complicated. The 
naval arms racing of the pre-carrier capital ship era, for 
example, provided relatively straightforward metrics of 
national power.26 As strategist Emily Goldman points out, 
however, when competitors choose to offset, rather than 
match, their opponent’s investments through asymmetric 
weapons and tactics, things become more complex.27 The 
current global security environment, characterized as it is 
by fluid networks of nefarious non-state threats, epito-
mizes such “off-setting” strategic contests. Fringe actors 
seek to dethrone the liberal world 
order in a number of arenas—
political, social, cyber, and 
cultural—yet not in battlefield 
dominance, where US strength 
lies. This profound asymmetry 
makes assessing relative power 
problematic. In the parlance of net 
assessment, the relevant attributes 
of “red” (the opponent) are not 
easy to compare to those of “blue” 
(ourselves).28
The difficulty of measuring this 
environment goes beyond mere 
complexity, however. Building 
on our preceding discussions, 
the capacities of liberal states are 
further limited by their inability to bring their military 
investments to bear on many types of threats. This problem 
is compounded by the fact that wealthy liberal states, such 
as the United States, have increasingly relied on advanced 
technology and stand-off weaponry to dominate battle-
fields, but wars are being fought in cities and villages, not 
on traditional battlefields.29 Current internal assessments 
of military capability are skewed to heavily weight such 
expensive platforms and their supporting systems. As 
we noted earlier, however, such weapons can play only a 
minor role against the security threats that liberal de-
mocracies currently face. Therefore, standard assessment 
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frameworks may be heavily biased toward overestimating the capacity of such 
states to effect outcomes in the international system, and lead to overly ambi-
tious policy and the ready resort to force. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The United States finds itself in a world full of concerns, none of which currently 
threatens the existence of the nation. Our discussion highlights the fact that, 
ironically, the lack of an existential threat creates its own host of problems for 
policy makers. More specifically, in such an environment, a “powerful” liberal na-
tion, such as the United States, may be essentially powerless to bring its national 
security investments to bear on the existing threats. We demonstrate that the 
militarily most powerful nation in the world is indeed struggling with one arm 
tied behind its back, a fact that policymakers and planners must bear in mind. 
What are some of the implications of this situation?
First, the constraint of social and political norms on military execution is a fun-
damental consideration in any decision regarding the discretionary uses of force. 
Simply basing decisions on the array of impressive assets available to policy 
makers has and almost surely will lead to grief. Normative constraints should be 
acknowledged at the outset of mission planning, yet the nuts and bolts of opera-
tions are normally developed in a vacuum, divorced from the broader social and 
political context. This situation needs to change. 
Second, if, after careful consideration, military force remains the best option, 
then the types of units selected for missions are critical. On the one hand, 
conventional military forces are purpose-built to effectively destroy enemy units 
in an unconstrained environment. But on the other hand, the current array of ir-
regular conflicts is not merely a “lesser included” subset of such missions. Small 
packages of specially selected and trained forces may not only be more effective 
than larger conventional units at operating in complex “human terrain” but also 
are less likely to garner the media attention that mobilizes normative critics.
Finally, using military force as a policy tool in today’s threat environment 
requires a fundamental reworking of our outdated, Cold War–legacy planning 
mechanism. A new perspective on military planning is necessary to build and 
equip forces that can operate in politically constrained settings against non-
state opponents. Such a new approach should consider combat effectiveness as 
only one attribute of a viable force structure, while simultaneously taking into 
account normative political constraints. In doing so, we can avoid building 
expensive arms that remain tied behind our back.  v
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The Weather of Violence: Metaphors and 
Models, Predictions and Surprises
Dr. Melvin J. Konner, Emory 
University
Metaphors (figures of speech) are a common part of the Eng-
lish language, and official speech about war, terror, foreign policy, and defense, 
including the net assessment of violent state and non-state actors, is no excep-
tion.1 We talk about hawks and doves, predators and prey, boiling over, coming 
to a head, pressure cookers, cat and mouse games, and the spread of viruses or 
cancer. In just the second half of March 2015, US leaders and commentators used 
these metaphors to describe sectarian violence:
 ¡ 17 March, General Mark Welsh, Air Force Chief of Staff: “I use a 
NASCAR analogy. … If the car trailing you has been behind for a couple 
of laps but [you are] consistently slowing … you cannot keep them from 
passing.” 2
 ¡ 18 March, US Representative Nicola Tsongas: “I liken [fighting ISIS] to a 
multidimensional chess game”;3 and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter: 
“The ISIL phenomenon is metastasizing.” 4
 ¡ 23 March, David Adesnik of the Foreign Policy Initiative: “If it’s March 
Madness [college basketball playoffs], if it’s the NFL [National Football 
League], you usually want to play a home game. In war, it’s better to play 
an away game.” 5 
 ¡ 26 March, retired Admiral James Stavridis speaking of Afghanistan: 
“There are … microclimates” 6 of sentiment in local populations. About 
troops fighting Ebola: “Life is not an on-off switch. We don’t fund this 
magnificent military just to be in combat. … It’s a rheostat between hard 
power” and soft. “We can dial that rheostat toward the soft power.” 7 He 
showed the on-off switch with his finger, the rheostat, by turning his 
hand. 
 ¡ 28 March, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, addressing the Arab 
League Summit: “Gaza remains a tinderbox.” 8
Some metaphors work better than others at enlightening the listener.9 Does 
Gen. Welsh’s NASCAR image in the example above improve the listener’s under-
standing of a fighter pilot being out-flown by a better plane? 
If metaphors are brief, evocative figures of speech, analogies are extended paral-
lels in which one unfamiliar thing is compared to another more familiar thing 
in order to enhance understanding. For instance, terrorism is often described in 
terms of a disease process, for which self-damage (the autoimmune response) is 
a risk of response. In other words, we are not just comparing a terrorist network 
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to, say, a virus, but we are also comparing different aspects of counterterrorism 
to the body’s natural immune response and the doctor’s treatment of the illness. 
Some analysts develop models, which are in essence elaborate analogies (which 
can take the form of diagrams on paper or algorithms on computers) that, at 
their best, can be manipulated mathematically to test hypotheses about real-
world systems. To take another common example, the label “Hawks and Doves” 
generally refers to some population composed of aggressors (Hawks) and nonag-
gressors (Doves) and became a quantifiable game theory model in evolution 
and other fields. “Metastasizing,” the cancer metaphor used by Secretary Carter, 
can be made part of an organismal model, although, as I demonstrate later on, 
that model can become confusing. Is ISIS a virus or a cancer attacking the body 
politic? The implications are different because the analogies imply different 
pathologies and types of treatment.
A rheostat (one of the metaphors used by Admiral Stavridis) changes resistance 
to electricity, as with an electric light dimmer switch, and in engineering models, 
may be a part of systems that are simple or complex, closed or open. But to make 
the term useful as a model, we would have to decide whether we want to model 
the entire electrical system including the rheostat, or whether we want to use the 
analogy of a rheostat in isolation in order to bring a fresh perspective to people’s 
minds. Finally, the term microclimate, also used by Stavridis, suggests either an 
analogy or a model of populations parallel to the way we model climate, weather, 
and other natural systems. In some ways, climate and weather can be predictable 
and cyclical, but in other ways, they can be formally chaotic and emergent. 
I discuss some models and their possible value later in the article, but first I 
consider a basic view of human violence with regard to the rise of violent non-
state actors (VNSAs), seen from the perspective of evolutionary anthropology. 
This is a discipline that makes regular use of metaphors, analogies, and models. 
For example, Lawrence Kuznar and Carl Hunt (in this issue) discuss the Blue-
Green-Red metaphor and turn it into a model with measurable components.10 
But they also discuss VNSAs as tribes or chiefdoms, terms that are much closer 
to the reality of many of these groups. If al Qaeda is compared to a tribe and ISIS 
to a chiefdom, the parallels are more precise and elaborate than is the case with 
the color metaphor, and anthropologists have testable models for how tribes may 
evolve into chiefdoms. 
More importantly, tribes, chiefdoms, and VNSAs are human groups that must be 
understood in a deeper evolutionary context because their dynamics are not only 
analogous to but also consistent with and resulting from a long evolutionary 
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history. The members of these groups follow known scientific laws and exhibit 
biological and behavioral processes that are not metaphoric but real. I first 
describe these processes before considering the value of some often-used models 
for describing terrorists and counterterrorism. I conclude that studying the thing 
itself (i.e., a particular VNSA or network) remains a superior route to under-
standing, instead of relying on models or analogies.11 I also describe some general 
principles that may help guide a common-sense approach to net assessment.12
A View from Evolutionary Anthropology
Evolutionary anthropology sees human nature as real and definable, resulting 
from evolution by natural selection.13 Statistically, historically, and biologically, 
violence is part of our nature but much more for males than females—a differ-
ence with deep evolutionary and genetic roots.14 This includes individual as well 
as group violence, ambush and raiding, and deadly as well as ritualistic conflict. 
Tribal conflicts are especially intense because the absence of state or other 
higher-level authority encourages almost continual war. Examples of perpetual 
tribal conflict include the Enga of highland New Guinea, the Yanomamo of 
Amazonia, the Ilongot of the Philippines, the Nuer of southern Sudan, and 
the tribes of the British Isles between CE 800 and 1200.15 The possession of 
women has frequently been a source of violence among men, and the seizure and 
accumulation of women was pervasive in ancient times. Reproductive inequality 
among men intensified with the rise of empires because the most powerful men 
could accumulate many more wives and concubines than ordinary men, but rape 
has always been a part—often a goal—of war.16 This behavior transcends time, 
space, religion, and ideology. One analysis of Y-chromosome DNA (inherited 
only through males) shows that rape has long been a successful reproductive 
strategy for some men at the expense of others, and of women.17
Proportional to population, violence has declined by many measures, owing 
to the rise of the state, the spread of democracy, and a general improvement in 
women’s status.18 Violent organizations like Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, and ISIS19 resemble tribes or chiefdoms, emerging in weak 
states where young men’s violent tendencies and desire for women can gain free 
expression. Violent actors may operate in small groups where individuals goad 
each other (the “bunch of guys” thesis)20 or in larger groups resembling whole 
tribes, but either way, fictive kinship among members is important, and prestige 
is a common goal. Our brains, it turns out, are not very good at distinguishing 
fictive from real kinship or the prestige that leads to reproductive success from 
the fatal kind that does not.21
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Anthropologist Kuznar describes the limits of rationality 
in conditions where potential gains in prestige exceed 
likely losses (a sigmoid model of motivation). Such a 
situation can trigger a primitive brain response (in the 
limbic or emotional brain) in young men who are anxious 
to gain prestige, and it is at this point that such men are 
likely to act.22 Social media have proved to be effective 
means for worldwide recruitment by extremist groups that 
exploit this emotional vulnerability. As recent research 
has shown, poverty and lack of education do not explain 
terrorism, a finding that James A. Piazza, writing in this 
issue, confirms.23 Piazza adds that new democracies may 
experience a rise in acts of terrorism, while more mature 
democracies are at a lower risk. He points out the three 
factors that most strongly contribute to a rise in ter-
rorism: human rights abuses, the exclusion of minority 
groups from civil institutions and access to political 
power, and foreign military inter-
ventions, all of which pit domestic 
groups of some kind against each 
other.24
Groups in conflict, regardless of 
size, mirror and escalate each other’s 
violence, a process called mimetic 
rivalry. “Sacrifices” in war become 
literally that: making the cause 
sacred with one’s blood.25 Religious 
motives intensify these processes 
but are not necessary for violence to 
intensify.26 As Michael Vlahos has 
demonstrated, groups are always 
fighting for identity, among other 
goals.27 When a global civilization (e.g., ancient Rome, 
today’s advanced Western world) faces a tribal group with 
a stronger identity, the less well-defined civilization may 
lose. But war strengthens identity and the sense of kinship. 
According to a study published in 1968, of 3,421 years of 
recorded history to that date, only 268 years saw no war 
anywhere in the world.28 Since 1968, there have been no 
war-free years.29 
All this violence is carried out mainly by males, although 
women often participate.30 Women do become terrorists 
as well, but infrequently enough that they can be enumer-
ated and named; they often become involved through 
romantic or family relationships with men, which suggests 
ways to track their involvement.31 Surveillance must not 
ignore women, but men, especially young men, form the 
core, the main leadership, and the great majority of almost 
all violent groups’ members. 
Why should we consider human nature when analyzing 
terrorist violence? Many in the West, including many intellec-
tuals, are in denial about the innate quality of violent behavior 
and hold a naïve view of the current extremist violence as a 
political response to overreach by a hegemonic West.32 One 
result of this misinterpretation is the defunding of surveil-
lance and defense agencies within governments. Further-
more, since young men account for the overwhelming 
majority of violence in all cultures, any psychological or 
psychobiological analysis must focus on them.33
Metaphors or Models?
If violence is a fundamental, ever-present danger, can we 
predict or at least minimize it? The ability to predict and/
or prevent is one purpose of models, and it is how they 
should improve on metaphors or analogies, which only 
emphasize a point or, in the worst 
cases, distract from it. Models 
should clarify thinking, be 
quantifiable, and make testable 
predictions. Of these three goals, 
models that apply to VNSAs have 
often accomplished the first 
and sometimes the second, but 
rarely the last.34 In this section, I 
briefly summarize three models 
commonly used in the study 
of violence: the Hawk-Dove 
game theory model; the general 
systems model; and the chaos, 
emergence, and complexity 
model. All three have figured in 
discussions of international order, making them poten-
tially relevant to net assessment, but not all have proven to 
add analytical value to common-sense approaches.
The Hawk-Dove Model 
Some models began as metaphors. In evolutionary theory, 
Hawks and Doves are actors in a mathematical game-
theory model.35 Consider a population with two genetic 
types: one that always fights for a resource (Hawks) and 
one that always yields (Doves). If the entire population 
consists of Doves, then an aggressive Hawk mutant that 
emerges within the population will thrive, and over 
generations its genes will spread. But under reasonable 
assumptions about the cost in death and damage that 
comes with fighting, and the value of the arbitrary 
resource—food, territory, opportunities for reproduction, 
and so on—Hawks will not completely eliminate Doves 
because, at a certain point, Hawks will usually encounter 
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other Hawks, and the fight will be a costly mistake instead of an easy win. (Note 
that, like all models, this one requires certain simplifying assumptions, such as 
an inability to know in advance how the adversary will behave.) In a population 
consisting primarily of Hawks, Doves will gain fewer resources but lose much 
less by not fighting, thus gaining an evolutionary advantage. Equilibrium is 
reached when it is no longer advantageous for either Doves or Hawks to increase 
in number; this is called an evolutionarily stable strategy, and the equilibrium 
point depends heavily on the assumptions about the damage from fighting versus 
the value of resources. 
To expand the predictive value of the model, we can add intermediate types, 
called Retaliators (who attack only when attacked first) or Bourgeois (who act 
like Hawks when they already hold the resource to be fought over but like Doves 
when they do not). Again, the outcomes depend on the arbitrary values of costs 
and benefits that have been assigned by the researcher to test hypotheses and 
variables. But these models can successfully predict animal behavior and may 
suggest some general strategic principles. For example, non-Hawks of various 
types could benefit from two Hawks fighting; this might suggest that if two or 
more of the United States’ potential adversaries are in conflict (e.g., the Soviet 
Union and China prior to 1990, Iran and Iraq before 2003, or Shi’a and Sunni 
Muslims), watchful waiting may be more adaptive than intervention. Other 
(often metaphoric) game theory models, such as “Chicken,” “Tit-for-Tat,” or 
“The Prisoner’s Dilemma,” have helped clarify thinking about competitive 
relationships, but no game is better than the assumptions of its creator.
The Organismal Model 
The idea that a society is an organism has long had intense appeal for researchers, 
but is this a model or just a metaphor?36 Either way, it has two big problems: 
members of a society are not genetically identical, and they often secede from 
one social “organism” to join another. The functional integration of society is 
therefore transient, and a society can be regarded as an organism only meta-
phorically. To some extent, every individual in a society is at odds with every 
other member in the competition for resources and status, however closely they 
are allied.37
Still, some extensions of the metaphor, or analogies, do seem useful. An excep-
tion among our body’s otherwise genetically identical cells is the cancer cell, 
which mutates to grow without restraint. No longer genetically identical to the 
host, it multiplies at the expense of other cells—and eventually the entire or-
ganism. The appropriate response is to cut the tumor out, or degrade and destroy 
it. The speed of a tumor’s metastasis depends not only on the point of origin and 
the cell type of the cancer (e.g., breast or prostate), but also on the cooperation 
of whatever distant organ it potentially spreads to (such as bone, liver, or brain—
the “seed and soil” hypothesis), just as viruses and other infections depend on 
host resistance.38 Disease also can be a useful analogy to vulnerability to violence.
Equally interesting is the immune system extension, especially autoimmunity. 
The influenza epidemic of 1918 hit young adults hardest because they had robust 
immune systems: they were killed by their own bodies’ response to the virus. 
Many symptoms of infectious disease, such as fever, are actually part of the 
body’s immune response. In the same way, autoimmune diseases—including 
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allergies, multiple sclerosis, lupus, and rheumatoid 
arthritis—are inherently self-attacks and, therefore, hard 
to deal with, as is cancer, because they derive from the 
body’s normal functions.
Counterterrorism professionals have appropriately been 
concerned about the damage that US responses to attacks 
have done—in blood, treasure, and freedom from govern-
ment interference—to the United States. Triggering this 
kind of self-damaging response from their targets has been 
a goal of terror groups.39 Controlling our responses to 
terrorist attacks may be analogous to withholding antibi-
otics where they are inappropriate or limiting the body’s 
immune attack on itself when trying to fight an infectious 
or autoimmune disease. 
Systems Models
Systems models, which originated in engineering and were 
extended to the biological and social sciences, have proven 
their predictive value in the physical world.40 Closed, 
negative feedback (cybernetic) 
systems, such as a thermostat or a 
guided missile are straightforward, 
mathematically representable, 
theoretically generative accounts 
that offer testable predictions. In 
biology, examples of (relatively) 
closed systems include homeo-
stasis (the tight autonomic 
regulation of body temperature 
or blood sodium), homeorhesis 
(developmental changes that re-
turn to a genetically guided path), 
and imprinting (the tendency of 
ducklings to follow the mother). 
These are not completely closed 
systems, because they all require 
the exchange of energy and 
substance with the environment, and imprinting requires 
initial learning, but they are in principle almost as simple 
as the thermostat and the guided missile. 
Still, strictly speaking, all living systems are open because 
they must acquire and use both energy and information 
to resist the disorder of the world (which is called entropy, 
one aspect of the second law of thermodynamics). In the 
process of evolution, living systems accumulate informa-
tion that allows them to maintain their improbable order. 
In the 1950s, general system theory claimed to be able 
to provide models for everything from physics to eco-
nomics, but after decades of effort, it is difficult to point 
to examples in general system theory that do with open 
systems what is readily done with closed ones: predict.41 
The burden of proof is now on the proponents of these 
models to offer quantitative representations and predic-
tions that are more useful than what we usually see on a 
“galactic radiator” PowerPoint slide: scores of boxes and 
arrows that tell us only that the system is very complex 
and not very predictable. The systems model is thus a 
metaphor, but not a sharp one. Theoretical biologist 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy wrote “that it took more than 
two hundred years before the intuitive world system of 
Copernicus and Kepler was transformed into the physics 
of high-school textbooks.” 42 Counterterrorism cannot 
wait so long.
Chaos, Emergence, and Complexity 
Complexity models have largely displaced general system 
theory, which they partly resemble.43 Complexity models, 
however, try to describe what emerges from formal chaos, 
which is a new and important 
concept.44 Identified in practical 
terms by meteorologist Edward 
Lorenz, chaos refers to a determin-
istic outcome that is technically 
unpredictable due to its extreme 
sensitivity to initial conditions.45 
A butterfly fluttering its wings in 
Japan might theoretically cause a 
storm in Mexico weeks later, but 
there would be so many causal 
steps, each amplifying the last, 
that even if we had all the data we 
needed to trace them, it would 
take a computer larger than the 
universe, with transistors more 
numerous than atoms, to do the 
calculation. 
Something similar applies to predicting whether it will be 
raining in Washington, D.C., two weeks from now. Chaos 
theory explains why this prediction cannot accurately 
be made and may never be made. We can predict the 
chance of rain a few days out with some confidence, but 
as we move further out in time, the steps in the causal 
chain add up and error accumulates exponentially. We 
should recognize what we can predict, beyond the next 
few days. We can say with a high level of confidence that 
the temperature in Washington, D.C., will not reach 100 
degrees Fahrenheit on any day in January in 2025, but it 










during that month in 2125 (the whole world will be warmer, but local climates 
are less predictable). When will a devastating blizzard or Category 5 hurricane 
next hit the city? Good question. 
Meteorologists know what they do not and cannot know. The worldwide 
network of climate scientists systematically shares data and maintains vigilance 
so that when an unpredictable disaster (including a natural one, such as an 
earthquake, tsunami, flood, tornado cluster, or volcanic eruption) does approach, 
it will be identified as early as possible. While doing the science, this network 
also broadcasts minute-by-minute information to billions of people. With this 
information, advanced countries and even many developing countries are able to 
build infrastructure to specifications that minimize damage, prepare evacuation 
and other response plans, and err on the side of caution in invoking such plans.
What about emergence and complexity? Slowly heating a viscous fluid initially 
produces formal chaos, but patterns eventually emerge, often around “strange 
attractors”—unpredictable points of organization. Emergence in turn can lead 
to stable complexity, a state that is intensively studied by mathematicians and 
scientists. Scientists once thought that the laws of chemistry would be derivable 
from physics, those of biology from chemistry, and so on up to economics and 
even history—but this is no longer the case. Even the structure of the ammo-
nium ion (four hydrogen atoms around a nitrogen atom) cannot be predicted 
from physical laws one level down. In other words, “more is different.” 46 
So each level of complexity has its own patterns and laws, because the relation-
ship between any level and the next higher up is one of unpredictable emer-
gence. David Ruelle, one of the first physicists to apply chaos theory, wrote in 
1991, “The physics of chaos, … in spite of frequent triumphant announcements 
of ‘novel’ breakthroughs, has had a declining output of interesting discoveries. 
Hopefully, when the craze is over, a sober appraisal of the difficulties of the 
subject will result in a new wave of high-quality results.” 47 In 2001, however, 
he remained skeptical.48 John Holland, another pioneer, concluded in 2014 
that physicists who study “complex systems are still primarily at the stage of 
collecting and examining examples.” 49 Embracing complexity theory is to some 
extent a matter of taste, as with the other models, and even with metaphors or 
analogies; beyond the key discovery of formal chaos and its explanation of the 
limitations on prediction, there is no compelling scientific reason to adopt it.50
The Limits to Prediction
Citizens wonder why there have been so many US “intelligence failures,” in-
cluding the failure to predict the Tet Offensive (1968), the Yom Kippur War 
(1973), the Iranian revolution (1979), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), 
the fall of the Soviet Union (1989–1990), the second Indian nuclear test (1998), 
the 9/11 attacks, the absence of nuclear weapons in Iraq, and the Arab Spring, 
among others.51 Some were failures of communication. US Senator Daniel Pat-
rick Moynihan predicted the Soviet collapse while then–CIA director Robert M. 
Gates loudly proclaimed the USSR’s invulnerability.52 The CIA warned the Jimmy 
Carter administration of Soviet military preparations throughout 1979, but be-
cause these warnings were downplayed, there was no high-level anticipation that 
the USSR would invade Afghanistan.53 According to the 9/11 Commission Re-
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a surprise,” and the failure to foresee them was due to “an overwhelming number 
of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries.”54 
A decade later, the same bipartisan group that wrote the report welcomed the 
implementation of its recommendations for improving intelligence processes but 
assessed the threats to be even more complex and growing, and asked “whether 
the United States is prepared to face the emergent threats of today.” 55 Missing 
the “meteoric growth of ISIS” is US intelligence’s most recent failure.56 What 
are we overlooking or underestimating now: the international Islamist network 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, working quietly but relentlessly for a worldwide caliphate;57 the 
thousand non-Islamic hate groups in the United States;58 Pakistan’s instability; 
or perhaps a widening Saudi-Iran war?
It would help if mathematical models in organismal, general systems, or chaos/
emergence/complexity theory could make specific or even general predictions 
that are better than common-sense conventional ones based on demography, 
economics, politics, and surveillance of current developments. There is little 
evidence as yet that these models can do this. 
In net assessment, therefore, we can be skeptical about models as predictors, and 
focus on (1) making general and specific preventive and defensive preparations 
based on our best overviews of future war and terror; and (2) seeing emergent 
patterns as soon as possible.59 “Big Data” may be more useful than big models,60 
although more modest models (e.g., the Hawk-Dove model, Kuznar’s economet-
rics of prestige, and chaotic unpredictability) could help. 
Using the weather analogy, we should push the predictive science, know where it 
stops being useful, and use systematic worldwide surveillance to detect emergent 
threats. In 2014 and 2015, ISIS, like the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, emerged 
as a major threat that we could have identified much earlier, better prepared 
for, and possibly prevented.61 Meteorologists and other geoscientists agree on 
most of the methods and theories related to their fields, share information, and 
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disseminate their findings quickly and effectively both to 
the general public and up the chain of command. They 
are properly and predictably resourced, inspire confidence 
because they know the limits of their knowledge (the real 
contribution of chaos theory), and constantly improve 
surveillance. Imagine if we had a daily “weather of vio-
lence” report: a fast-paced one- or two-minute broadcast 
across media that featured a colored world map, hot spots 
around the world, and a summary of what was “happening 
now.” People would get used to thinking about the occur-
rence of terrorism frequently and calmly.
This is not a nihilistic view of net assessment. If violence 
is a part of human nature, following broadly predictable 
patterns, then the United States must take the following 
actions:
 ¡ Defense and intelligence budgets must not be 
arbitrarily cut by sequester or fluctuate year to year.
 ¡ Information sharing among intelligence agencies 
must be smooth and reliable.
 ¡ Leaders must heed warnings, followers must be 
forthright about sounding warnings, and whistle-
blowers must be protected from retaliation.
 ¡ The United States must maintain a decisive 
military edge, a large professional human intel-
ligence network, and cutting-edge cybersecurity 
and data integration. The United States must also 
be willing to station forces longer in some places, 
in peacetime as well as in combat.62 Prevention is 
better than treatment.
 ¡ US spending for diplomacy and foreign aid should 
be increased as leverage against enemies that 
exploit vulnerable populations.63
 ¡ Diplomatic efforts should aim specifically to end 
human rights abuses, promote the rights of mi-
nority groups, and prevent invasions, three factors 
known to foster terrorism.64
 ¡ Programs that educate girls and empower women 
should be funded. They improve local and national 
economies, reduce violence in the long run, and 
are the best ways to spend an aid dollar.
 ¡ A naïve public must be educated about the clear 
and present danger of terrorism. They might be 
more willing to spend public money to support 
those who spy, fight, and die for them, and on the 
diplomacy and foreign aid that will help mitigate 
needless risk.
 ¡ Responses need to be measured: government 
officials and the public must neither overreact nor 
underreact to acts of terrorism.
Conclusion
Paul Bracken, in his 2006 “basic starter kit” for net assess-
ment, expressed skepticism about mathematical models 
similar to those outlined here: “You can get many things 
right by just thinking about them a little bit.” 65 He urged 
that we “model simple and think complex” (italics in the 
original), resist the “tyranny of small decisions,” and reject 
“muddling through.” 66 My list of needed actions, above, 
is very much in the spirit of Bracken’s recommendations. 
Net assessment demands a longer time span than policy 
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makers commonly use. Like the fluttering butterfly in Japan, “change that is 
imperceptible from day to day can produce large effects viewed over time.” 67 This 
applies to positive processes like education as well as negative ones like recruiting 
terrorists. 
Finally, Bracken wrote, “An interesting metaphor for net assessment is to 
compare it to Wall Street. … Time after time some players use information 
that is available to all to make a lot more money than other players.” 68 As with 
investing, net assessment is neither an art nor a science but a practice; some 
investors, like Warren Buffett and John Templeton, have done very well using 
simple models. Gathering, sifting, and integrating information matters more 
than complex equations.
Common sense approaches to anticipating and reducing risk are vital because 
violence is inevitable and our ability to predict it is limited. Models that work 
may be more useful than metaphors, but so far, they continue to promise more 
than they deliver in practical predictions. US President Theodore Roosevelt 
borrowed a wise African proverb that became a useful metaphor for US foreign 
policy: Speak softly and carry a big stick. We can expand that now: Speak softly, 
carry a big stick, make friends and strengthen them, scan the horizon constantly, 
and if you see something, shout your warning until you are heard. v
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Trapped by the Paradigm:  Why Net 
Assessment May Not Contribute to 
Countering Terrorism
Dr. Dennis Jett,  
Pennsylvania State University
This volume of CTX is devoted to discussing ways to refine net 
assessment concepts and address the complexity of the terrorism/counterterror-
ism dynamic. It might therefore seem heretical to question whether net assess-
ment can make any contribution to countering terrorism, but that is what this 
article does. 
Net assessment encourages a broad consideration of strategy instead of focusing 
only on the immediate tactical situation. As one article about net assessment’s 
application to counterterrorism put it, “The answers are not as important as the 
process we use to determine them.” 1 If the process leads to asking the wrong 
questions, however, those answers will not matter either, and they could lead to 
short-term tactical successes that culminate in long-term strategic failure. For 
that reason, when it comes to counterterrorism, those who apply net assessment 
need to do so with caution and be fully aware of its inherent limitations and 
assumptions. 
Before considering the potential for net assessment to contribute to efforts 
against terrorism, it is necessary to have a clear definition of both terrorism and 
net assessment. It is also useful to ask why the question of whether to apply net 
assessment to terrorism has arisen in the first place. 
Terrorism can be defined as the tactical threat or use of violence by non-state 
or subnational groups or individuals against noncombatants for purposes of 
political coercion. Terrorist groups are therefore different from insurgencies. In-
surgents aim to foment revolution and overthrow a regime through the control 
of territory. Once they have accumulated sufficient manpower and weapons, 
insurgencies often engage the armed forces of the regime they are trying to 
overthrow in combat. Terrorists, by contrast, are typically far fewer in number, 
do not attempt to control territory, and seek a political victory through fear and 
coercion rather than by military means.
The line between the two types of groups is often crossed. If the military 
strength of a terrorist organization grows, and if the forces supporting the 
regime are weak, then the terrorists can begin to act like insurgents and move 
toward more direct military action. The Islamic State, or ISIS, for example, 
has existed for years, but the chaos in Syria and the discontent caused by the 
sectarian policies of the government in Iraq allowed ISIS to accumulate suf-
ficient strength to achieve major military victories. Conversely, and much 
more frequently, insurgent groups that become weak militarily, or are forced to 
go underground by superior regime forces, may adopt the tactics of terrorists 
rather than risk annihilation. The Lord’s Resistance Army, which began in the 
1990s as an insurgency to overthrow the Ugandan government, has devolved 
over years of military defeats into a small, chronic terrorist cell without any 
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Both groups may use violence against civilians as a means 
to achieve their aims, but terrorists use such means 
almost exclusively, while insurgents have broader goals 
than merely drawing attention to themselves and their 
cause. Insurgents usually want the support of at least some 
portion of the civilian population in order to expand their 
territory and power, so their attacks on noncombatants are 
normally directed against those who support the regime in 
power. Such distinctions are important because the group’s 
objectives help determine which tactics should be used to 
defeat it. 
For instance, on the one hand, once ISIS became more 
like an insurgent group than a terrorist group, a bombing 
campaign could potentially be effective against it. The 
primary defensive tactic of terrorists, on the other hand, is 
to be indistinguishable from noncombatants and blend in 
with the local population. Therefore, the use of air power 
against them will cause collateral damage that ultimately 
creates more terrorists than it eliminates. Because of its 
increased vulnerability to military power, therefore, ISIS 
may not have the staying power of 
a group like al Qaeda unless it is 
able to further evolve. 
The distinction between insur-
gents and terrorists is important to 
understand, but it alone does not 
end the debate about what tactics 
are appropriate in each case. There 
is no “one size fits all” approach 
to insurgent movements. As 
political scientist Paul Staniland 
has pointed out, every insurgency is different and requires 
a different response.3 
Defining Net Assessment
The need for a clear definition applies not just to terrorism 
but to net assessment as well. Different scholars have come 
up with a variety of descriptions for the technique. Paul 
Bracken of Yale University defines net assessment by listing 
its fundamental aspects: long-term thinking, looking at 
important problems in depth, considering socio-bureau-
cratic behavior, concentrating on strategic asymmetries, 
defining the features of good strategies, and remembering 
that a strategy is multifaceted and goes beyond rivalry and 
arms racing.4
For strategic analyst Eliot Cohen, net assessment is 
“the craft and discipline of analyzing military balances” 
where a military balance is a quantitative and qualitative 
appraisal of two or more military forces.5 Harvard’s 
Stephen Rosen describes it as “the analysis of national 
security establishments in peacetime and war.” 6 Thomas 
Skypek, building on the work of Cohen and Rosen, offers 
the following description of net assessment: 
A multidisciplinary approach to national 
security analysis that is comparative, diag-
nostic, and forward-looking. More precisely, 
it is a framework for evaluating the long-term 
strategic political-military competitions in 
which states engage. Its aim is to diagnose 
strategic asymmetries between competitors 
and to identify environmental opportunities 
in order to support senior policy makers in 
the making of strategy.7 
According to a 2009 Department of Defense directive, 
net assessment is the comparative analysis of military, 
political, economic, and other factors governing the rela-
tive military capability of nations.8 
Before considering why these de-
scriptions of net assessment pose 
problems when they are applied 
to counterterrorism, it is worth 
considering why this question 
comes up at all.
The US Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) is a legislatively 
mandated report that requires 
the Department of Defense 
(DoD) to assess the threats and challenges that the nation 
faces and describe how the DoD will address them now 
and in the future. When the QDR was first published in 
1997, terrorism was mentioned a number of times, but 
only in the context of being one of a number of possible 
threats from non-state actors.9 In the 2006 QDR, ter-
rorism and counterterrorism were mentioned 38 times, 
and winning the “war on terrorism” was described as 
the DoD’s first priority.10 By the 2014 QDR, combating 
terrorism came in fifth in the list of priorities after 
maintaining nuclear deterrence, defending the homeland, 
defeating any adversary, and providing a global stabilizing 
presence.11 
Clearly, the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq caused 
the threat of terrorism to achieve the prominence it 
obtained in defense planning. But just as the public never 
had any way to assess the false claims that Saddam Hus-
sein was somehow involved in the 9/11 attacks, they also 
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had little ability to assess the magnitude of the threat posed by 
terrorism. 
The reality is that as a cause of death for most populations, 
terrorism lies somewhere near the bottom of the list. In a 
typical year, as many American civilians die from falling 
furniture as from terrorism.12 And yet government 
spending per death caused by terrorism is 50,000 
times higher than for any other cause of death.13 If 
the goal of government is to reduce the deaths of 
Americans, there are cheaper ways to do it. For 
instance, thousands of lives would be saved every 
year by simply raising the minimum age for 
buying cigarettes from 18 to 21.14
But in the wake of 9/11, any serious analysis of how 
to spend defense money efficiently and effectively 
gave way to the intense and overpowering fear 
provoked by the events of that day. Because 
of that fear on the part of the public, people’s 
unwillingness and inability to calculate the 
real risk posed by terrorists and the influence of 
the military-industrial lobby, terrorism will continue to be 
overstated as a threat while far more serious dangers, like climate change, 
go unaddressed.
Why Net Assessment Might Not Work
Regardless of the size of the threat, there are a number of problems inherent 
in applying a traditional net assessment approach to counterterrorism. In the 
quote above, Skypek characterized net assessment as a framework for evalu-
ating the long-term strategic political-military competitions in which states 
engage. Net assessment diagnoses strategic asymmetries between competitors 
and identifies environmental opportunities that help policy makers formulate 
strategies. That definition helps highlight the difficulties with regard to 
counterterrorism.
A Terrorist Organization Is Not a State
First of all, a terrorist organization is not a state and does not act like one. 
It is in essence a criminal gang with political rather than economic motives. 
Insurgents may try to act like a state in the territory they control, but terrorists 
don’t worry about providing services to civilians or protecting them. 
If net assessment is an appraisal of military balances, what happens when military 
might does not matter? Terrorists don’t have a navy or an air force. They use light 
weapons because heavy weapons systems need to be maintained and supported, 
are hard to deploy, make an attractive target for regime forces, and reduce the 
ability of the terrorists to hide among the civilian population. Thus, there is no 
category of weapons in which terrorists are likely to have or even want to have su-
periority over regime forces. This includes weapons of mass destruction (WMD: 
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Many terrorists would like to obtain WMD because there is nothing that spreads 
terror more effectively than the threatened use of such a weapon.15 But again, 
the military balance does not matter. The regime in power or its allies can have a 
thousand nuclear weapons or none at all, and it will not make a difference to the 
counterterror calculus. If a terrorist organization obtains even one such device, 
it has the tremendous advantage of being able to decide when, where, and how 
to use it. 
Terrorist Groups Come and Go
Another aspect of net assessment that does not yield useful results for analyzing 
terrorism is the emphasis on long-term trends. There are no barriers to entry 
to terrorism. Any group, or even individual, who decides to commit an act of 
violence against innocent civilians for political purposes can join the ranks of the 
terrorists. Timothy McVeigh showed that all it took to destroy a federal office 
building was some fuel oil, fertilizer, and a rented truck.16 
There is also no barrier to exit. Terrorists can decide to cease using the tactic at 
any time, for whatever reason. They can join the political process, for instance, 
as some of those involved in the Irish Republican Army did following the Good 
Friday Agreement of 1998. 
Long-term planning is appropriate for assessing the security strategies of a state 
because the state’s interests and options do not change rapidly. Bracken wrote 
that “the need to tie US defense policies with the anticipated reaction of oppo-
nents is absolutely fundamental to net assessment.” 17 The problem with terrorists 
is that it is difficult to anticipate their reactions. They play by no rules, and they 
use their unpredictability as a major tactical element. 
The first page of the founding manifesto of the US Department of Homeland 
Security stated, “Today’s terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with 
virtually any weapon.” The essay noting that statement also quoted FBI Director 
Robert Mueller as saying, “The greatest threat is from al Qaeda cells in the US 
that we have not yet identified.” 18 A dozen years after Mueller made that state-
ment, no such cells have been identified. So how does long-term planning assist 
with formulating strategies against groups that have no long-term plans?
Measures of Military Balance in Asymmetric Warfare Are Misleading
Governments are always going to have a resource advantage and a tactical dis-
advantage when it comes to combating terrorist organizations. Looking at 
military balances, therefore, is not going to produce any useful understanding 
of the problems or opportunities that might guide policy makers. It would be 
like using net assessment to determine how the police should combat crime. The 
militarization of the police force is not the answer, although those who observed 
the official reaction to the recent disturbances in Ferguson, Missouri, might be 
excused for thinking that approach has already been undertaken in parts of the 
United States.19
In addition, defining a problem as military in nature implies there is a military 
solution to it. An inappropriate military approach, however, has the potential 







commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan who struggled to 
find ways to decrease the level of enemy activity did so 
“without considering how their mere presence in the 
battle space drove insurgent activity.” 20 Cornelia Beyer 
argues that “economic and political constraints should be 
considered as root causes for international terrorism,” and 
that “imperialism, understood as control and interven-
tion, enhances human insecurity in the Middle East, and 
therefore endangers global security.” 21
An excellent example of Grazier and Beyer’s points is 
the so-called “surge” of US troops in Iraq in 2006. There 
are those who say the surge won the war and that US 
President Barack Obama has now forfeited that victory 
by withdrawing American troops.22 That is nonsense. The 
troops were withdrawn as provided for under the Status of 
Forces Agreement negotiated by the preceding George W. 
Bush administration. No Iraqi government would agree 
to let them stay on Iraq’s soil unless they were subject 
to the Iraqi judicial system, and no American president 
would agree to such a condition. More to the point, the 
surge only “won” a temporary lull in a civil war. That was 
not because of the additional troops. It was a surge of 
American money. Some $400 million was spent to put 
over 100,000 insurgents on the government payroll.23 The 
relative calm lasted as long as the 
insurgents were kept employed. 
When Americans stopped paying 
them and Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nouri al-Maliki failed to continue 
the practice, many of the erstwhile 
insurgents then resumed the 
insurgency. Most of the decision 
makers in the ISIS organization are 
former Iraqi military officers.24 This 
outcome seems to indicate that political and economic 
solutions are essential for quelling the fighting over the 
long run. What is more, unless the ingrained culture of 
corruption and cronyism within the Iraqi security forces is 
dealt with, those forces will continue to fail.
Stability in Iraq cannot be achieved by a simple military 
solution. An opinion piece published in September 2004 
by US General David Petraeus, then-commander of mul-
tinational forces in Iraq, does not, however, convey that 
understanding. Eighteen months after the initial invasion, 
Petraeus claimed that “Iraq’s security forces are developing 
steadily and they are in the fight. Momentum has gathered 
in recent months. With strong Iraqi leaders out front and 
with continued coalition support, this trend will con-
tinue.” 25 That assessment no doubt helped President Bush 
to get reelected six weeks later and Petraeus to earn his 
fourth star, but it was not a remotely accurate prediction 
of the future. 
In 2014, the security forces trained by Petraeus’s troops 
and organized by al-Maliki outnumbered ISIS fighters by 
at least 20 to 1, and yet they could not prevent ISIS from 
quickly taking over one-third of Iraq’s territory.26 In April 
2015, the city of Tikrit was liberated from ISIS control, 
but this was accomplished by Shi’ite militias with Iranian 
advisors, not by US-trained Iraqi troops. It appears that 
al-Maliki’s successor, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, 
may choose to rely on those militias rather than building 
an army capable of fighting.27 If he does, then the civil 
war will continue without end. Even so, US soldiers found 
themselves back in Iraq in April 2015 trying to train the 
Iraqis to act like an army. They were stunned by the degree 
to which the security forces had deteriorated since the 
Americans had departed in 2011.28
A Stronger Military Is Not Always the Solution
Despite the obvious difficulty of creating an army with a 
will to fight, Petraeus is not the only military leader who 
sees military strength as the solution to Iraq’s civil war. A 
2010 article in Foreign Affairs by US Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates, entitled “Helping 
Others Defend Themselves,” is 
another example of how that 
approach has the potential to 
make the situation worse.29 
Gates characterized “the main 
security challenge of our time” 
as an attack on a US city that 
emanates from a state that 
cannot govern itself or secure its 
own territory. He recommended 
responding to this threat by expanding US efforts to build 
the governance and security capacity of other countries, 
especially those that have the potential to become failed 
states. Beefing up the militaries of all the governments 
at risk would be no small task. A 2010 article in Foreign 
Policy magazine noted that there were 33 wars currently 
underway in the world.30
During the Cold War, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the US ambas-
sador to the United Nations during the Ronald Reagan 
administration, argued that the United States should sup-
port authoritarian governments as long as they supported 
Washington’s policies. She asserted that such governments 
could be led to democracy by example and were less 
repressive than revolutionary regimes. In practice, this led 
Washington to embrace repressive rightwing dictators 
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(e.g., Saddam Hussein of Iraq) and some vicious rebel groups (e.g., the Contras 
in Nicaragua) while undermining leftist democrats.
It is arguable whether getting into bed with dictators and warlords helped the 
United States win the Cold War. One thing this policy did do, however, was 
make a mockery out of any American claim of respect for human rights and 
democracy. The article by Gates is little more than an argument for using an 
updated version of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine to wage the so-called War on 
Terror. That cannot be done without embracing repressive regimes and leaving 
the rest of the world with the impression that America’s values are jettisoned the 
moment the United States perceives any threat to its security or interests. Such 
a policy will encourage new recruits and additional support to flow to insurgent 
and terrorist organizations just as surely as the accidental killing of civilians in 
drone strikes has done. 
A 2012 poll found that 74 percent of Pakistanis viewed the United States as their 
enemy, in no small part because of the use of drones to kill alleged militants.31 
Pakistan is officially an ally of the United States. How is any US strategy there 
going to work if three-quarters of the Pakistani population view Americans as 
the enemy? To successfully combat terrorism, it is essential to have the support 
of the civilian population. When the strategy, as Gates suggested, is to build up 
the militaries of states that are failing, it will be impossible to avoid climbing 
into bed with repressive governments, thereby undermining US credibility and 
interests worldwide. 
The human rights organization Freedom House issues a report each year that 
divides the nations of the world into three categories—countries that are free, 
partly free, and not free—based on a comparative assessment of global political 
rights and civil liberties.32 In the 2010 Freedom House ranking, 47 countries 
(24%) were rated not free, 58 countries (30%) fell into the partly free category, 
and 89 were deemed free (46%). If those rankings are compared with the 60 
least stable countries on Foreign Policy magazine’s Failed States Index, however, 
the picture becomes much starker.33 According to the Freedom House survey, 
just under half of all failed states are not free, and just over half are partly free. In 
other words, there are no countries in the world that are both fully democratic 
and politically unstable.34 
Any attempt to improve the situation in these countries through net assessment 
or any other analytical process should start with an unbiased evaluation of the 
political and economic realities that are destabilizing them, and an in-depth 
understanding of how those realities might render outside assistance not only 
ineffective but counterproductive. To put it most succinctly, helping “friends” 
like these defend themselves inevitably means helping the world’s most repressive 
and corrupt governments defend themselves from their own people. And that 
effort will only create terrorists, not defeat them. 
What Contribution Might Net Assessment Make?
Net assessment can contribute to an effective counterterrorism strategy if 
analysts and policy makers keep in mind that (1) a terrorist organization is not a 
state; (2) military balances and asymmetries don’t matter; (3) long-term planning 
is probably impossible; and (4) effective policy has to be based on the political 
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realities within a country and on helping allies that are worth supporting. The 
character and culture of the US national security establishment is to view threats 
as military problems with military solutions. If net assessment reflects that 
approach, it is bound to fail as a tool for effective policy making. Instead, net as-
sessment should contribute to a better understanding of what the real threats are 
and what the real possibilities, costs, and benefits of mitigating and if necessary, 
combating them might be. 
This kind of assessment does not happen today. As analysts John Mueller and 
Mark Stewart put it, 
In general, counterterrorism agencies simply identify a potential 
source of harm and try to do something about it, rather than sys-
tematically thinking about the likely magnitude of harm caused by 
a successful terrorist attack, the probability of that attack occurring, 
and the amount of risk reduction that can be expected from counter-
terrorism efforts. Without considering such factors, it is impossible 
to evaluate whether security measures reduce risk sufficiently to 
justify their costs.35
Without fully taking into account the nature of the enemy and the nature of the 
threat, any attempted military solution will often be counterproductive. Policy 
makers should be willing to consider alternatives to military force. As Nauro 
Campos and Martin Gassebner observed, “One crucial goal of anti-terrorism 
policy must be the containment of violent conflict around the globe. However, 
recent experience suggests that direct military intervention can be counterpro-
ductive, while foreign aid might be effective in the medium to long term.” 36 The 
budget of the Pentagon is 11 times that of the US Department of State, however, 
because US leaders are prone to assume that military solutions are always going 
to be more expedient and effective than diplomatic ones, even when there is no 
evidence to support that supposition.
Those who conduct net assessment should also resist the temptation to make 
the process into a number-crunching exercise. Each insurgency and each 
terrorist group is unique, and only a profound understanding of each case will 
enable analysts to find a policy to deal effectively with it. One aspect that should 
be assessed in comparative terms is the motivation of the terrorists versus that 
of the security forces of the government in question. As Iraq demonstrates, the 
security forces there are two years of training away from being effective—and 
always will be. That situation won’t change until the country’s political and 
military leaders become less corrupt and sectarian.
The fact that there are no unstable fully democratic countries would argue that 
the most effective way to combat terrorism in countries at risk is to support a 
strong civil society, an independent judicial system that is capable of promoting 
justice, a free press, and a fair democratic process. Doing so requires thinking 
that goes against the tendency of the national security establishment, politicians, 
and the media to hype the threat and exploit the fear caused by terrorist acts. If 
net assessment can help to put these concerns into a clearer perspective, it will 
assist those who argue for a more effective approach to counterterrorism. If it 
does not, it will only contribute to a problem that has already cost far too much 
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Policy makers often only want validation of the judgments they have already 
made, rather than any truly informative new analysis. Too often they make 
decisions based on personal political gain rather than an honest evaluation of 
what will work to achieve a goal and what will not. For instance, drone strikes 
have been popular with the current administration because using them puts 
no US troops at risk and publicly demonstrates resolve in combating terrorism. 
Five hundred such targeted strikes have already been conducted, resulting in an 
estimated 3,674 deaths, including 473 civilians.37 As the opinion poll in Pakistan 
demonstrates, one more casualty of this policy has been the standing of the 
United States in many parts of the world. Strategies that seem convenient can 
entail significant costs, but this unwelcome truth may be difficult to point out 
to those with a stake in the status quo. Perhaps the most important contribution 
that an honest net assessment can make is to speak truth to power. But anyone 
who thinks that is easy to do or that it automatically brings results has never 
tried it. v
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This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating Terrorism Archive 
Project (CTAP).1 Dr. Cécile Fabre is a professor of philosophy at the University 
of Oxford and a senior research fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. She spe-
cializes in the ethics of war and has written most recently on that topic in her 
book Cosmopolitan War (Oxford University Press, 2012). On 11 February 2015, 
Amina Kator-Mubarez sat down with Dr. Fabre to discuss her research on the 
ethics of warfare and how cosmopolitan theory relates to military personnel and 
operations.2 
AMINA KATOR-MUBAREZ: Dr. Fabre, please briefly explain cosmopolitan 
theory and what significance it has for military personnel. 
CÉCILE FABRE: Cosmopolitanism is the view that an individual’s fundamental 
rights and obligations are completely independent of national and political 
borders.3 According to cosmopolitans, all human beings, whoever they are and 
wherever they happen to live in the world, have a set of basic rights and obliga-
tions towards all other human beings, whoever those other human beings are 
and wherever they happen to live in the world. By way of example, if I, a French 
national, have a choice between saving the life of another French national and 
saving the life of someone from Afghanistan, a typical cosmopolitan principle is 
that I cannot justifiably use the fact that I am French as a reason to give priority 
to the life of the French national over the life of the Afghan person.  
National membership is irrelevant to the cosmopolitan, particularly when 
it comes to life-saving decisions. I thought it would be interesting to look at 
cosmopolitanism’s theory of the just war because, when we talk about war, it 
is very tempting and intuitively plausible to regard nationality and political 
membership as being very relevant. Most people take the view that, in war, a 
community is entitled to privilege the life of its own citizens over the lives of 
even enemy civilians, let alone enemy soldiers. Cosmopolitanism has reemerged 
as a very dominant political theory in the last 30 years or so. Alongside it, war 
has reemerged as a very important field of inquiry, but the two really haven’t 
been looked at together. In the book, therefore, I ask, If you are a committed 
cosmopolitan—as in fact many fellow moral and political philosophers are—
what does that mean with respect to how we should conduct ourselves in war? 
Indeed, on what grounds should we make a decision to go to war?  
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Your account of just war theory, as you state in your book, 
relies on “the right to kill in self-defense and the right to kill in defense of 
others,” yet there is extreme controversy among present-day just war theorists 
about whether self-defense is a promising justification for killing in war.4 What 
would your response be to this?
FABRE: There is an instance in which appealing to self-defense is not controver-
sial, and that is the view that says states are like individuals. So, in the same way 
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that individuals have the right to defend their own lives by killing those who 
threaten them, states have the right to defend their integrity by attacking other 
states in national defense. I don’t think that is right because I don’t think states 
have a personality and a status that is separate from the personalities and status 
of individual members of that state. When we look at war in general, and wars 
of defense in particular, at the end of the day, I think we really have to assess 
whether individual members of states have the right to kill in defense of their 
own interests. Of course, you could object that political actors, especially in a 
democracy, decide to wage war as representatives of the people—that is, of the 
group whose state it is. But even if that is correct, it still is not the same as the 
claim, “Britain kills enemy soldiers to defend itself.” And in fact, that claim is 
odd. Britain is not a person, it does not kill, it does not have interests. Rather, 
British individuals have interests, insofar as they are members of this community, 
and British individuals—in other words, soldiers—kill. That is what we ought 
to say. That is the first point to make.  
Such a view is thought to be very controversial because it implies that there is 
a profound difference between the morality of killing in war on the one hand 
and the morality of killing in an interpersonal context on the other hand. A lot 
of people say that war is different, and that the norms that govern killing in war 
are very different from the norms that govern killing in an interpersonal con-
text. I, and many other people as well, disagree with that view, which you could 
argue is the “orthodox” position on killing in war. Once the war has started, 
this thinking goes, there is no longer any moral difference between the soldiers 
who fight on either side of the war, irrespective of whether they are fighting 
for the right causes and pursuing the right kind of aim. From that view, if you 
think about it, as soon as Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 and the 
war started, the German soldier who killed in pursuit of his country’s inva-
sion of Poland was as entitled to kill a Polish soldier in self-defense as a Polish 
soldier was entitled to kill that German soldier in defense of his own country 
and his own life. 
Now, we wouldn’t apply that sort of model in an interpersonal context. In the 
interpersonal context, if I am under attack by someone who has no business 
attacking me, I am absolutely entitled to kill him in self-defense. But even at the 
point at which I start defending myself, even though my attacker’s life is under 
threat from my counterattack, he is not entitled to try to kill me. What he has to 
do is surrender. If he were to succeed in killing me, even if at that point he did it 
in defense of his own life, most jurisdictions would hold him liable for murder. 
This is why people who disagree with my point of view say, “Well, war is dif-
ferent, because in war the German and the Polish soldiers are morally on a par.” 
But in interpersonal situations, the wrongful attacker is not on a par with his 
victim. From my view—a view that others like David Rodin and Jeff McMahon 
have defended as well—there is no good reason to think of war as being radically 
different from interpersonal violence, in these particular respects, at any rate.5  
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Do cosmopolitan theorists receive a lot of criticism?
FABRE: Well, we do receive a bit of criticism. But interestingly, we receive less 
criticism from serving soldiers than I would have expected. This particular 
view I just described, which I defend in the book and which other people have 
defended too, we call the revisionist, or neoclassical, account of killing in war. 
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I have talked to soldiers about the revisionist account, and in particular I have 
pressed the thought that soldiers have to think about the reasons why they are 
agreeing to go to war. They have to ask themselves, When I go off to Iraq to kill 
Iraqi soldiers, do I have any business doing this? When we press this question, 
we are met with much more sympathy by serving soldiers than we would have 
expected before we engaged in that kind of dialogue.
KATOR-MUBAREZ: What do you mean by sympathy?
FABRE: What I mean is that a surprising number of the serving soldiers I have 
spoken to have been willing to say, “Yes, you are right. Of course we have to ask 
ourselves whether an order to deploy is a just order. If we conclude that the order 
is not a just order, we have to accept that, if we go to kill enemy soldiers, there 
is a sense in which what we are doing is wrong.” Now, quite often the soldiers 
evoke other reasons, overriding reasons, to justify going to war nevertheless. But 
they are more open than I thought they would be to the possibility that there is 
one sense in which this particular act of killing, carried out in prosecution of an 
unjust war, is itself morally problematic.
KATOR-MUBAREZ: How do you think they reconcile that choice within 
themselves?
FABRE: The reason I have heard put forward most often by serving soldiers is 
loyalty to their mates. I had a British soldier actually tell me, “It was wrong for 
me to go to Iraqi in 2003, I shouldn’t have done it in some respects. It was wrong 
of me to kill those Iraqi soldiers, but I did it because of my mates, because they 
had trained with me, they had become dependent on me, and I was dependent 
on them. In the end, I decided that the bond of loyalty I had with them was 
more important than my duty not to go and kill those Iraqi soldiers. But I can 
see there is a sense in which killing those Iraqi soldiers was wrong, although not 
as wrong as betraying my comrades.”
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Special Forces operators often have increased autonomy 
in their work. Does this increase their ethical challenges on the battlefield? If 
so, how?
FABRE: Well, I think it does, because if they are more autonomous, then it 
seems to me that they cannot as easily invoke the fact that they were given a very 
prescribed and precise set of orders with which to comply. It seems to me that 
greater autonomy on the battlefield means they actually have more scope to ex-
ercise their own private, individual judgment about the legitimacy of what they 
are doing. In that respect, one might argue that Special Forces have a luxury that 
other soldiers don’t have: the choice of how exactly to fight. They are treated as 
autonomous agents to a greater extent than soldiers who serve in other branches 
of the military. 
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Do you think the idea of autonomy is easier for US military 
personnel to put into practice than for international military personnel?
FABRE: I am not an empiricist; my research is in philosophy, not in political 
science. But I wouldn’t be surprised if, generally, the armed forces that serve in 
democratic cultures would find it easier than the armed forces that serve under 
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are doing, if only because personnel in democracies might 
find it easier to find information. The media, for example, 
are powerful allies when it comes to questioning what the 
government is doing. Let me give you an example from 
the British context. When Britain was deciding whether 
to go to war against Iraq alongside the United States in 
2003, General Mike Jackson, who took over as Chief of 
the General Staff of the British Army six weeks before the 
invasion, went on the record to say that he, of his own 
authority, had decided to seek legal advice as to whether 
the invasion would be lawful. If the invasion turned out to 
be unlawful, it would count as a crime in international law, 
and Jackson didn’t want to risk being prosecuted for it. 
Now, there are two things to consider about this. First of 
all, Jackson took advice from a lawyer who was, in fact, 
the government’s senior lawyer. So a number of people 
said, “Well, why did he not seek completely independent 
opinions?” But the point I want 
to make is that Jackson did feel 
that he could at least take advice, 
but more importantly, that he 
could say publicly that he had to 
reassure himself that what he had 
been ordered to do was the legal 
thing to do. I very much doubt 
that the head of the army in—take 
your pick—Pakistan, or Iraq under 
Saddam Hussein, or Syria right now, 
would be able to say, in public in 
his own country, “Well, you know 
what? I am going to check it for 
myself before I agree.” In fact, if the 
advice Jackson received had said the 
invasion was unlawful, Jackson always said he would have 
resigned, and I believe him. I believe he would actually 
have been true to his commitment not to act in a way that 
was illegal, and resigned. So I imagine that soldiers in the 
United States would find it easier to take those sorts of 
steps in public than would soldiers in countries where the 
sense that you really have to do whatever you are ordered 
to do is much more deeply rooted. 
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Current US policy seeks to build a 
global network of Special Forces operators. Are there 
additional ethical concerns when building partnerships 
that may span many cultures and political systems?
FABRE: I think that is a very interesting question. I would 
imagine that the most obvious concern is twofold. The 
first task is to make sure that the rules of engagement 
are the same for all members of that particular network. 
The second is to ensure that when there is a conflict 
between the rules of engagement that are being used by 
that network and the rules that are internal to a particular 
military culture, the former will prevail. This is the kind of 
difficulty we have witnessed when it has come to mul-
tinational peacekeeping forces, where cultures can have 
different understandings, for example, of what counts as 
imminent danger. I think that is one of the deepest chal-
lenges for coalitions. 
I suppose the other challenge arises for any network 
that claims to be global but whose various participants 
are vastly asymmetrical when it comes to the resources 
available from each member to that particular network. 
Any such network would face the challenge of trying to 
be a genuinely multilateral network as opposed to being 
a network funded and operated by the most powerful 
backer or contributor, under the guise of multilateralism. 
For the individual soldiers 
taking part in such a network, 
this raises specific difficulties. 
For example, suppose that you 
belong to the army of the less 
powerful member of the net-
work. The rules of engagement 
are dictated by the powerful 
backer and are much more strict, 
or much more lax, than the rules 
you are used to. How should 
you behave in this case? What if 
following those new rules means 
that, by your lights, you would 
commit a criminal offense (if 
those rules are more lax), or, on 
the contrary, would end up not engaging with the enemy 
at all, at some risk to yourself or others (if those rules are 
more stringent)? So these are the two potential problems 
that come to my mind at this point. 
KATOR-MUBAREZ: You wrote a paper discussing the 
ethics of war termination. The United States has had 
two recent instances, in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which 
it could unilaterally time its withdrawal. What is your 
perspective? Could the Iraq withdrawal have been done, 
or can the withdrawal from Afghanistan be done, more 
ethically?
FABRE: Well, I am not the only one to worry that the 
withdrawals are happening—or did happen—too early. 
The situation the Americans left behind in Iraq is not one 
that is conducive to a durable and overall just peace. That 
always is the worry when you decide to withdraw. So I 
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do think that the coalition forces were right not to leave Iraq as early as 2005 or 
2006. I can’t help thinking that a more sustained effort, and in particular a more 
sustained effort at ensuring that the rule of law could genuinely be implemented 
in both countries, would have been desirable. There is still a major attack at least 
once a month somewhere in Iraq. That is not a country that has been left stable. 
Now, the counterargument goes like this: Well, look, the coalition forces are 
not the only ones responsible for the mess. There is a sense in which the Iraqis as 
a society have to take responsibility for the enduring power of insurgent groups 
to destabilize the country. I can see the force of that argument. I am not yet 
persuaded, though, that there was nothing more that the United States and its 
partners could have done to help the legitimate Iraqi armed forces, and enforce-
ment mechanisms in particular, to get stronger.  
KATOR-MUBAREZ: With the impending withdrawal from Afghanistan, do you 
think Afghans will blame the United States for failing to leave the country in a 
stable state?
FABRE: They might blame the United States, but in a way, the question is not 
so much will they blame the United States—or Britain, for that matter, since 
Britain is about to withdraw as well. The question is whether we really did all 
that we could have done to ensure, for example, that the Taliban do not come 
back into power and devastate the country the way they did for a few years, some 
time ago. To ensure that young girls and women do enjoy genuine opportunities 
for a decent life. To ensure that the Afghan economy does not continue to be as 
dependent as it has been on the culture of poppy, for example. 
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Thank you for talking with us.
FABRE: Thank you. v
ABOUT THE INTERVIEWER
Amina Kator-Mubarez is a research associate in the Defense Analysis Depart-
ment at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
This is a work of the US federal government and not subject to copyright protection in the United 
States. Foreign copyrights may apply.
NOTES
1  The Combating Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP) aims to 
collect and archive knowledge on strategy, operations, and tactics 
used by military and other security personnel from around the 
world in the twenty-first–century fight against global terrorism. 
Collectively, the individual interviews that CTAP conducts will 
create an oral history archive of knowledge and experience in 
counterterrorism for the benefit of the CT community now and in 
the future.
2 This interview was edited for length and clarity. Every 
effort was made to ensure that the meaning and intention 
of the participants were not altered in any way. The ideas 
and opinions of all participants are theirs alone and 
do not represent the official positions of the US Naval 
Postgraduate School, the US Department of Defense, 
the US government, or any other official entity.
3  For a detailed explanation of cosmopolitanism’s history and the 
variety of its manifestations, see Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, 
“Cosmopolitanism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 
2014 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
cosmopolitanism/
4 Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012): 55.
5  David Rodin and Jeff McMahan are two of the most prominent 
just war theorists. For more on their work, see David Rodin, War 
& Self-Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and 





Making Decisions, Taking Ethical 
Responsibility, Part 2: Recalibrating  
the Job, Reconsidering the Tool
George Lober,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
In my previous column, I called into question the self-defini-
tion expressed by some military officers, that they are merely “tools.” Such a 
perception, I wrote, implies that these officers see themselves not necessarily as 
independent ethical agents but rather “simply as instruments—the ‘tools’—of 
a greater organization, and the means by which some directive or policy or 
strategy or law will be carried out.”1 As I stated in that column, such a self-image 
disturbs me because it suggests the forfeiture of personal moral responsibility. It 
also raises the question, “Why does a tool need to be bothered about ethics?”
To illustrate my point, I offered two cases. The first was of a patriotic Swiss police 
captain, Paul Grüninger, who chose to ignore a Swiss law mandating that Jewish 
refugees attempting to escape the Nazi annexation of Austria in 1939 by crossing 
illegally into Switzerland be denied entry. Grüninger realized the refugees would 
likely be killed if they were returned to Austria, and so he not only disobeyed 
the law but did everything in his power to help the refugees.2 As a result, he is 
credited with saving an estimated 3,600 lives. 
However, once his efforts were discovered, Grüninger was put on trial, con-
victed, and fined. He lost both his position and his career, and he his family suf-
fered penury and ostracism for the rest of his life. Yet until his death, he insisted 
that he had no choice but to fulfill his “human duty” to help the refugees.3  
The second case involved Captain Luc Lemaire, a Belgian military officer who 
led a contingent of 90 Belgian soldiers in Rwanda at the outbreak of the 1994 
genocide. As the killing spread, hundreds of Tutsis and moderate Hutus sought 
refuge at the school site in Kigali where Lemaire and his men were posted, and 
within days the number of refugees had swollen to over 2,000. Lemaire and his 
soldiers maintained their protective guard while members of the murderous 
Hutu Interahamwe circled the school in vehicles, taunting the Tutsis inside. 
When Lemaire received an order to pull his men from the school, however, he 
decided to obey that order and abandoned those under his protection. Approxi-
mately 2,000 Tutsis were massacred at the school shortly after the Belgians left. 
Five years later, in a televised interview, Lemaire, like Grüninger, would claim 
that he “had no choice.” 4 
I wrote in my earlier column that, in some ways, the two cases struck me as eerily 
similar. Both Grüninger and Lemaire were confronted with individuals who 
came to them seeking shelter and protection from almost certain death. Both 
men were officers who had the capability to provide that protection. Both men 
were under orders not to provide protection, but one of them refused to follow 
that directive, while the other chose to obey. Unlike Grüninger, however, Le-
maire suffered no official consequences when he returned home and continued 
to receive military promotions. A facile analysis of the difference between the 
two men’s responses to their orders might suggest that Grüninger saw himself as 
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a human being first and not as a tool, while Lemaire may have seen himself as a 
tool of policy first and a human second. Nevertheless, I speculated in my column 
that the situation was likely far more complicated than that.  
In the three months since I wrote that piece, I have researched the Rwandan case 
further and discussed both cases with various Special Operations personnel. In 
doing so, I have come to the conclusion that I could not have been both more 
right and more wrong in my speculation. I was right in that the situation at the 
Rwandan school was indeed more complicated than it appeared. The Human 
Rights Watch report Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda details 
the fact that Lemaire had made the situation at the school perfectly clear to 
higher-ups in both the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) 
and the Belgian military command.5 In the first days of the killings, however, 
the mandate for UNAMIR troops shifted significantly, from monitoring a peace 
agreement and supporting a transitional government to securing the safety and 
immediate evacuation of foreign nationals.6 Sheltering Rwandans such as those 
at the school became a lesser concern. To his credit, Lemaire even sought the 
medical aid of Médicins sans Frontières for those under his protection, but the 
medical teams “could not get through to the post.” 7  
In testimony three years after the Belgians abandoned the school, Lemaire 
asserted that “authorities in Belgium were aware that Tutsi at [the school site] 
were dependent on protection by Belgian UNAMIR troops and that they could 
have permitted their rescue had they provided for a longer stay by the evacuation 
forces.” 8 Nonetheless, those authorities did not provide that possibility, and 
Lemaire would subsequently compare the situation at the school to a large fire 
for which he and his men possessed only a fire extinguisher, when what they 
required was “a fire engine.” 9
I was wrong, however, to imply that Lemaire’s choice boiled down to one of 
merely obeying or disobeying an order. The Human Rights Watch report affirms 
how, from the early days of the genocide, Lemaire was deeply concerned about 
the fate of the Tutsis under his protection if and when his soldiers should leave 
the school, and he expressed that concern directly to those higher in command. 
Additionally, though, the report highlights an element in his ethical calculus 
that I neglected: his own sense of loyalty toward his men and his concern for 
their safety.
Over the past three months, as I have discussed these cases with individuals who 
faced similar choices during tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, two things consistently 
have been confirmed to me: first, Lemaire’s tactical situation was untenable, and 
second, it is one kind of calculation to choose to imperil one’s own life and career 
for an ethical choice, as in the case of Paul Grüninger; it is a far different calcula-
tion to risk the lives and careers of one’s subordinates for that same ethical choice. 
As Human Rights Watch reported,  
[Lemaire] had tried to find a solution to the crisis himself. But, he 
said, escorting all the displaced persons elsewhere at one time would 
have required more men than the ninety available to him. If he had 
tried to move them in several smaller groups, the first group might 
have passed without difficulty, but later groups would probably 
have been attacked, and he did not have enough ammunition to 
defend them.10
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As a consequence, when the security situation deterio-
rated and Lemaire became increasingly concerned with 
“the more and more serious pressure from the armed 
bands around the school,”11 he requested permission to re-
move his men from the school. In essence, when it became 
clear that no additional help was forthcoming and that 
the lives of his own men were increasingly threatened, he 
chose as a leader to protect his subordinates and support 
the mission with which he was legally charged, rather than 
to protect those innocents neither under his command 
nor part of his mission. And no matter how you cut it, 
that’s a lose-lose choice.
Seen in that light, I think I understand Lemaire’s deci-
sion a little better. I understand that he couldn’t legally 
or ethically order his men to risk their lives for a cause 
unrelated to their mission, and he couldn’t order them to 
engage in a rescue strategy in which they would be unable 
to adequately defend themselves. If, as a leader, he cared 
about the men under his charge—their lives, their fami-
lies, their demonstrated loyalty to him, the unit, and their 
country—then, I submit, he had an obligation to respect 
their lives enough not to endanger them for a moral cause 
of his personal choosing. That danger was all too real, 
given that 10 Belgian soldiers had recently been brutally 
murdered by the Interahamwe, while sentiment across 
Belgium for the withdrawal of the force was unanimous.12
But what, then, is the answer? Faced with such a horrible 
dilemma—an unsympathetic, unresponsive political bu-
reaucracy, the likelihood of Tutsis under his guard being 
slaughtered, the likelihood of his own outnumbered and 
under-armed men being killed—is there anything Lemaire 
could possibly have done differently?  
One option was offered to me recently by a combat-
hardened officer who snarled, “There’s no way I could 
leave those people [the Tutsis] to be killed. I’d tell my men 
they could leave if they wanted to, it’d be their choice. But 
I’d stay and defend those people with my weapon, even if 
it cost me my life.” When he offered that pronouncement 
in a room of 20 officers with similar experiences, there was 
a respectful silence. In one angry swoop, he had touched 
on two fundamental ethical principles shared by many in 
that room: he could not—one should not—abandon un-
armed innocents to be massacred, and in such a desperate, 
untenable situation, everyone under his command must 
be recognized as a separate moral agent entitled to make 
an independent existential choice. The men could stay and 
fight alongside him to protect the Tutsis, come what may. 
Or they could go. It was their call.  But if he was to live with 
himself as a moral man, that officer would choose to stay.
It’s a courageous, principled position, and one I’d never 
heard expressed before by a career officer. I have no doubt 
the man was absolutely sincere. But having said that, I do 
not fault Lemaire for failing to choose such a course. I 
believe the decision to stay is exactly the sort of position 
only those who have been tested and scarred by similar 
trials are qualified to take, and I am not remotely in that 
cadre. But it is a position I admire, if only for its Kantian 
strength in the face of political and bureaucratic calcula-
tion. It’s also, in my opinion, the position of an ethical 
leader. v
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THE WRITTEN WORD
Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide BombingReviewed by Captain Caleb Slayton
Dr. Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri calls his book a “fatwa.” 1 He 
carefully chose this title to complement the objective of the book’s methodologi-
cal approach and meticulously selected content. Tahir ul-Qadri is a well-known 
Muslim scholar from Pakistan (the title Shaykh ul-Islam means “scholar of 
Islam”) who writes for Muslim and non-Muslim audiences alike in an ongoing 
effort to correct damaging misperceptions of Islam. Unlike the half-baked, 
paragraph-long “fatwas” of self-proclaimed Muslim jihadists, the author’s first 
implicit point is that a legitimate fatwa (religious opinion) requires extensive 
research that pores over 1,400 years’ worth of Muslim writings, with an emphasis 
on scholarly consensus, the Qur’an, and proper Sunna interpretation.2 His 
second point is that, because the fatwas of violent jihadists lack the required 
background scholarship and logical rigor, the passionate conclusions of groups 
like al Qaeda, the so-called “Islamic State,” and Hezbollah are completely 
unfounded.
Not all fatwas need be 400 pages long, of course. Tahir ul-Qadri strives for an 
approach that Arabic scholars, Muslims, non-Muslims, and non-Arabic speakers 
alike can respect, although those of his audience who are not familiar with the 
Qur’an and the Arabic language may not necessarily benefit from the Arabic 
source texts he extensively cites for each quotation. Tahir ul-Qadri provides his 
own English translation of these Arabic texts for the reader’s benefit and the 
skeptic’s advantage, a tactic which allows the author partial control over poten-
tial misinterpretations of these religious writings. Having some rudimentary 
Arabic training of my own, I noted that the author often uses bracketed transla-
tions to temper potentially extremist interpretations.
The book’s preface grabs the reader’s attention quickly, with a summary of the 
book’s broad conclusions: Islam does not allow revolt against even unjust or 
oppressive regimes. Takfiri terrorists, those who accuse fellow Muslims of being 
apostates, have existed in every Muslim age and will continue to exist until 
the end times. Carefully, in short snippets with extensive source-document 
quotations, the author lays down his argument against any and every brand of 
terrorism, while expressing an extreme disgust for suicide. The author’s erudition 
and extensive use of scholarly quotes are meant to be—and are—impressive, but 
instead of persuading the reader, the torrent might simply drown him or her into 
submission.  
Tahir ul-Qadri concludes that Islam mandates the safety, security, and peace of 
all who live within its spiritual walls. Punishment for breaking not just Islamic 
law but also a country’s civil laws should be handed out fairly, regardless of reli-
gion, language, or race. Taking this argument further, the author claims that all 
who promote the violation of these principles should be regarded as rebels, who, 
along with the historical Kharijite sect, are not only criminals but mandated 
government targets.3 
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Tahir ul-Qadri quotes Hadith (the sayings and teachings 
of the Prophet and his companions) to argue that the 
Kharijite ideas historically come from the Najd region (the 
area of modern-day Riyadh), but he is careful not to label 
all Kharijite teachings as Salafi (pertaining to the first three 
generations of Muslim teachers and followers). Salafism as 
an exclusive observance can lead to fundamentalism and 
extremism. But those early Muslim leaders of the Salaf era 
also witnessed Mohammed’s methods firsthand. Therefore, 
possessing a deep understanding of the early Muslim era 
and its practices, respective of the modern context, is held 
in high regard by Muslims in general.  
Many modern terrorists play the religious part well, ap-
pearing more pious in Muslim practice, prayer, and fasting 
than other Muslims. Tahir ul-Qadri, also an active Sufi, 
says some terrorists in fact appear so devout that Hadith 
warns they would be difficult to target, because their pious 
works discourage any offensive against them.4 The violent 
jihadists’ mix of piety and attractive, grievance-based 
interpretations of political events, 
especially those that appear to be 
against the Muslim world, serves 
as both a powerful recruiting 
tool and a strong self-defensive 
measure.  
In Western media, academic circles, 
and especially military analyses, it 
has become increasingly difficult to 
separate (1) terrorism from Salafism; 
(2) the motive of political violence 
from that of religious fervor; (3) 
interpretations of the end times as espoused by Islamic 
State ideologues from the mainstream Islamic escha-
tological viewpoint; and (4) unlawful Islamic military 
offensives from what the shari’a prescribes as valid violent 
offensives. Through a very careful reading of historical 
texts, Tahir ul-Qadri claims not only that terrorist teach-
ings run counter to true Salafi ideals, but that he himself 
can disprove terrorist arguments using only the Qur’an 
and Hadith. The early Muslim era sets the standard in 
leadership practice and interpretation of shari’a; therefore, 
the Salafi approach to the Qur’an and Sunna exclusivity 
is an ideal that moderate scholars strive to obtain.5 Tahir 
ul-Qadri’s goal is to reclaim from the terrorists a proper 
understanding of an era that they have twisted to justify 
their violent cause.  
Tahir ul-Qadri again shifts the balance unexpectedly 
when he looks at the issue of rewards for violence. He 
would give terrorists only Hell for a reward, not 77 vir-
gins. But still, not to be outshone by the allure of Paradise 
for jihadis, he emphasizes the Hadith passages declaring 
that those who fight the terrorists will be richly rewarded 
and those who are killed by terrorists are the “best of those 
slain under the heavens.” 6
What makes the Islamic State different from other 
terrorist groups such as al Qaeda is its members’ belief in 
the impending end times. Their interpretation of current 
events, reached through a selective and biased reading 
of Qur’anic texts and Hadiths, serves as an incentive for 
recruits to join “the winning side” as the end of earthly 
life as we know it draws near. In order to reframe Islam’s 
end-times teachings, Tahir ul-Qadri argues that the 
Kharijite movement itself, both historically and in its 
present extremist form, is a symbol of the end of the age, 
its strength waxing and waning until the second coming 
of the Messiah. There is legitimacy in the Salafi approach, 
the author affirms, and there are rewards for proper 
violence. There is a moderate end-times schemata to ter-
rorist events. Finally, there is an obligation on all Muslims 
to adopt the author’s dominant 
Sunni and mystical Sufi version 
of Islam to defend the Muslim 
world by word and sword 
against the Islamist extremism 
that, according to this Pakistani 
scholar, misrepresents Islam. 
At multiple turns in the book, 
readers, especially those accus-
tomed to doses of military intel-
ligence and media descriptions 
of terrorism, will ask themselves, 
“Why don’t I see this moderate brand of Islam?” Most 
pungent of all, if fighting terrorists is obligatory for all 
governments in Muslim lands, why does the Muslim 
world seem to be the least financially invested in the fight 
and the most condemning of foreign intervention? Does 
it not appear that the ideal of security and safety that this 
scholarly Muslim author ascribes to Islam is more promi-
nent in non-Muslim liberal democracies? Could it not be 
argued that the equal justice and freedom of religion that 
Tahir ul-Qadri mandates for Islam are more prevalent in 
Western Europe and North America than in the Middle 
East and North Africa?
The disconnect is twofold. First, Tahir ul-Qadri represents 
the “orthodox,” or, in religiously neutral terms, the central 
academic theology of Islam. The vast majority in the 
Muslim world, however, are more concerned with the day-
to-day practice of Islam.7 Despite the generous support 
from Western and non-Western scholars and politicians 






critique to wonder at the actual praxis. Defining Islam 
does not define all Muslims any more than one definition 
of Christianity could encompass all forms of Christian 
practice. Second, it is still hugely difficult to come up with 
a definition of terrorism to which all would agree, given 
current political events and the intrigues of international 
relations.  
In fairness to this author of over one hundred books, 
I’m certain Tahir ul-Qadri’s debating methods are more 
equitable in other works. But as it is, the long book under 
review here should be twice as long. The author expends 
barely a page’s worth of ink on the terrorists’ point of view. 
His research would be improved if it included an extensive 
review and correction of terrorist use of specific Qur’anic 
passages and Hadith exegesis. Without a balanced debate, 
the thesis is left half empty.8 Additionally, Tahir ul-Qadri 
condemns modern terrorists for being takfiris—it is a bold 
counterpunch to call the terrorists non-Muslims in the 
same breath. In a debate where all 
participants claim Salafi excellence, 
knowledge of end-times doctrine, 
and authentic Islamic credentials, 
it would appear that the “takfiri” 
accusations go both ways.
In the final chapters of this 
extensive scholarly work, the 
author tempers his call for violent 
offensives against terrorists with 
his deeper, long-term counterter-
rorism strategy: education. Before 
anyone else is to lose his life, he counsels, scholars, Imams, 
political leaders, and teachers must invite Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike to adopt Tahir ul-Qadri’s vision of 
Islam. Only when non-Muslim extremists and rebels 
explicitly reject widespread educational campaigns, and 
only if victory is assured, should Muslims target them as 
legitimate targets of proper violent jihad. To the moderate 
Muslim core, education is the best approach to counter-
terrorism. Interestingly, the book’s author is implicitly 
asking the world to support Muslim missionary zeal in 
order to combat a global terrorist threat. This vision may 
not sit well with all military strategists, world leaders, or 
the rest of the world’s non-Muslims.    
As a student of African history, culture, and politics, I 
found it intriguing that today’s moderate Muslim voices, 
so keen to support a more pacifist, inclusive, and tolerant 
Islam, represent the same form of Islam that nineteenth-
century European colonizers actively encouraged and 
empowered for decades in the Sahel and the Sahara. To 
weaken the influence of contemporary violent jihadist 
movements, French and British policy encouraged 
coopting moderate Sufi leaders and elders and boosting 
their influence with mutually beneficial quids pro quo. 
Islam grew more rapidly during colonialism than at any 
other time in West African history.9 While various Muslim 
authors chastised these coopted Muslim leaders at the time 
and accused the colonial powers of supporting a “timid” 
Islam instead of respecting the dominant Islam of Usman 
dan Fodio, El-Hadj Umar Tall, or the Mahdi of Sudan, 
Islamic scholarship is reverting to a similar strategy today.10 
We appear to have come full circle. Is Tahir ul-Qadri sug-
gesting that the colonizers had it right 150 years ago?11  
Fatwa on Terrorism is an excellent read for the student of 
Islam. The sources, citations, biographical list of quoted 
scholars, and extensive lexical terms encompass a small library 
of Sunni Islamic thought. The counterterrorism argument 
is a subset of the debate within Islam on what it means 
to be Muslim. Tahir ul-Qadri leaves out politics, current 
events, and international rela-
tions in order not to muddle his 
free-flowing elucidation of source 
documents. But preaching the 
teachings of Islam still misses the 
reality of how one billion people 
differ in the practice of their faith. 
Until the terrorist arguments are 
given a little more respect through 
equally rigorous scholarship, 
books like these will continue to 
preach barely beyond the choir.  
As a final note to my own Special Forces work com-
munity, Tahir ul-Qadri’s Islam is an ideal that will take 
generations to form. A dominant peaceful, inclusive, 
democratic, and tolerant Muslim state would be a long-
term counterterrorism solution. However, my Special 
Forces comrades live and work in the now. Orthodoxy 
and its corresponding orthopraxy live in the realm of re-
ligious scholarship, university studies, and top-level writ-
ings such as this book. To understand the reality of any 
religious practice, Islam included, operators are better off 
interacting directly with their diverse grassroots partners 
in whatever locality they find themselves. Shaykh al-Islam 
Dr. Tahir ul-Qadri describes the Muslim world as it could 
be. Special Forces live in the diverse world where cultures 
actually live and sometimes struggle to survive. v 
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JSOU PUBLICATIONS
Special Operations Forces Reference Manual  
by Roby Barrett 
Issue Date: June 2015
This fourth edition of the Special Operations Forces Reference Manual was rede-
signed to support the Joint Special Operations University’s academic mission. It 
provides general information on US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force 
SOF. More specifically, this document is designed to accomplish three broad 
purposes:
1. Provide a single primary source of reference material on all SOF 
components.
2. Provide an overview of special operations and SOF to facilitate a broader 
understanding of SOF capabilities to academic institutions and personnel 
who may not routinely use this data.
3. Provide standard SOF reference data to SOF faculty members at profes-
sional military education institutions for use in their instruction.
These new JSOU Press publications are available electronically from the JSOU Public website, https://jsou.socom.mil, in 
the 2015 publications section. They are also available in the JSOU Library Management System, https://jsou.libguides.
com/jsoupublications
Saudi Arabia: Modernity, Stability, and the Twenty-First Century 
Monarchy 
by Roby C. Barrett 
Issue Date: June 2015
This essay by Dr. Roby Barrett will be of interest to any reader seeking a better 
understanding of the political and cultural history of Saudi Arabia. Special Opera-
tions Forces in particular need to appreciate the historical, domestic, regional, 
and other influences that affect the worldview and decision making of Saudi 
Arabia’s leaders, particularly regarding the US-Saudi security relationship. Dr. 
Barrett’s monograph is a fascinating, condensed history of Saudi Arabia that 
focuses on events and decisions that influence the modern political worldview of 
Saudi citizens. Examples include a history of tribes being ruled by outsiders; the 
pros and cons of alliances with the British and, more recently, the United States; 
the impact of global geopolitics (e.g., the Cold War); and the effects of regional 
neighbors’ policies and international events on Saudi Arabia’s domestic and 
foreign policies (including its relationship with the United States). This volume 
explains the importance of politically shrewd and pragmatic Saudi leaders and 
the ways in which Iran’s ambitions and policies threaten Saudi Arabia’s regional 
influence, as well as how the historical fracturing of the US-Iran relationship 
played well for Saudi Arabia.
The target audience for this manual spans from special operations staff officers and enlisted personnel at United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), its component and subordinate commands, the theater special operations 
commands, conventional force/unified commands and their staffs that may employ SOF in their areas of responsibility to 
partner-nation staffs, and both civilian and military educational institutions.
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written English. However, we may ask you to have your submission re-
edited before submitting again.
Ready to Submit?
By making a submission to CTX, you are acknowledging that your submis-
sion adheres to all of the submission requirements listed above, and that 
you agree to the CTX Terms of Copyright, so read them carefully.
Submit to 
CTXSubmit@GlobalECCO.org
If you have questions about submissions, or anything else, contact 
CTXEditor@GlobalECCO.org
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